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This paper tries to evaluate to what extent egalitarian education policy in France was 
determined by the colour of the party in government. The conclusion is rather clear: the 
colour of the party had an almost insignificant impact on egalitarian education policy in 
France. 
Este trabajo trata de evaluar el grado en el que la política educativa en relación con la 
igualdad en Francia ha estado determinado por el signo ideológico del partido en el 
gobierno. La conclusión es clara: el signo ideológico del partido ha tenido una 
importancia casi insignificante en la política educativa igualitaria en Francia.  
1. INTRODUCTION  
   
1.1. OBJECTIVE OF THE RESEARCH  
This paper analyses the French egalitarian education policy. It is framed within 
my Ph.D. thesis which explores the relationship between governments (specially 
social democratic ones) and egalitarian education policy, paying special attention to 
the Spanish and French cases [1] . This paper is an initial attempt to study the 
French case within the concerns of the thesis. It is based on research on the 
evolution of egalitarian education policy followed from 1981 to 1997 by governments 
in France.  
The objective of the research is mainly descriptive. Nevertheless, the starting 
point is a null hypothesis: the political colour of the party in government has an 
impact on the design and on the outputs [2] of the egalitarian education policy 
followed in France. This implies that the partisan impact could be at the level of  
design, but not of the outputs; or to the contrary, the partisan impact could be at the 
level of outputs even with marginal changes in the design. Therefore, 
implementation of design is important [3] . More specifically, the hypothesis is the 
following: the socialist party in government designs, implements, and has outputs 
that differ from those of conservative parties in government. This implies two kind of 
questions: do parties of different colours differ in the egalitarian education policy 
designed, implemented, and the policy outputs that produce?, And which are the 
models of egalitarian education policy that socialist, and even conservatives, have? 
A more concrete definition of the dependent variable, egalitarian education policy, 
will be provided in Section Two.  
The starting point for the comparison is the egalitarian education policy 
followed before 1981 by the successive conservative governments. From 1981 to 
1993 the Socialist Party governed for 10 years, the whole period except for two years 
of conservative government (from 1986 to 1988). After 1993 there was again a 
conservative government. But the partisan impact may be mediated by other 
possible variables that we will briefly revise in the following paragraph.  
First, the partisan preferences [4] of egalitarian education policy can change in 
a party over time. Second, the electoral support of parties, i.e. the party control of 
government, varied. In France, leaving aside the periods of cohabitation, the PS only 
had a majority government from 1981 to 1986; from 1981 to 1984 it governed with the 
Parti Communiste (PC) although it did not have to do so. From 1988 to 1993 the PS 
had a minority government. There were two periods of cohabitation, when the 
socialist president of the French Republic (François Mitterrand, from 1982 to 1995) 
shared power with a Prime Minister and a government composed of other party/ies; 
the first period lasted from 1986 to 1988, and the second from 1993 to 1995. Both 
governments were based on a coalition between the Union pour la Démocratie 
Française (UDF), a centre party with a liberal tradition, and a right-wing party from 
the Gaullist tradition, the Rassemblement Pour la République (RPR). These changes 
in the electoral support of the parties in government may also have an impact on 
electoral competition. Organization of parties (ideological factions, for example) and 
the degree of cohesion around egalitarian education policy could be other mediating 
factor. Third, societal variables such as the pressure of teachers, parents, students, 
the Catholic Church, as well as the influence of public opinion. And fourth, other 
institutional and international variables that unfortunately will scarcely be taken into 
account in this research. There are two groups of institutional variables: political, 
such as decision making procedures, bureaucracies, and so on; and other variables 
more specific to the educational field, such as the degree of connection and 
coordination of governments with teacher and student unions, and even with 
parents’ organizations, Catholic organizations, and even the Church itself, the 
treatment of educational matters by the Constitution, the legacy of the education 
system, as for example the degree of private education, the decentralization of 
education policy, and so on. The international variable is important for the 
constraints it may impose on national budgets and the pressures to have 
competitive national economies.  
The study of education policy towards equality in the French case is important 
in itself because, though there is an extensive body of literature on education and 
equality, the analysis is almost exclusively from a sociological perspective, therefore 
it does not incorporate a political perspective as this paper does. Two of the classic 
authors in the field of the sociology of education are French: Bourdieu and Boudon. 
The former, Bourdieu, defends the cultural thesis, which explains the inequality of 
educational opportunities in terms of different cultures in different social classes 
[5] . The latter, Boudon, defends the thesis that the different perceptions of costs and 
benefits of education that different social classes have are the main cause of 
inequality of educational opportunities [6] . The debate between these two authors 
has been, and still is, very important, and its relevance is not only restricted to 
France.  
The paper is structured in four Sections and the Conclusions. The second 
section will concentrate on the theoretical framework: mainly the definition of the 
dependent variable, egalitarian education policy, and finally the presentation of the 
two models (social democratic and conservative) of egalitarian education policy. The 
third section will present data for member countries of the European Union 
(including France). The fourth section analyses egalitarian education policy, mainly 
the design and its implementation, of the governments of different colours of 
the French history. And finally, the fifth section shows time series data of egalitarian 
education policy outputs for the relevant dimension and indicators.  
  
1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
The significance of the study of the relationship between governments, 
education policy and equality derives from a number of factors: First, the analysis of 
education policy has not received much attention from political scientists. Castles 
notices this in terms of quantitative cross-national analyses [Castles 1989:432] [7] , 
though his argument is valid for all kinds of studies. The lack of studies of education 
policy is evident in the literature on social and economic policy. For example, 
Skocpol and Amenta [1986] in their review of states and social policies do not pay 
much attention to education policies. Moreover, when the latter are considered, they 
are always examined through such broad indicators as aggregate public expenditure 
or attendance rates. At the same time, some of these studies have drawn 
conclusions with regard to government commitment to equality. No attempt has 
been made to re-think education polices in a way which would allow the creation of 
indicators that might explain the questions examined in this kind of research [8] .   
Second, studies of social democracy have paid little, if any attention to 
education policy; they have been more interested in welfare (without education) 
policies. Esping-Andersen's and Van Kersbergen's [1992] review of contemporary 
research on social democracy does not even consider education policy or the 
relationship between social democracy and education policy. Very recently Boix 
[1994] has examined education policy, arguing that it is an important component of 
governments' supply-side economic policies, and a distinguishing factor between 
social democratic governments and conservative ones because of its potential 
effects on equality. But he uses only aggregate public expenditure to test this 
hypothesis, and as said before, this is a very rough measure of equality in education. 
Maravall [1995] reviews the impact of social democracy on education policy, but he 
too uses mainly aggregate public expenditure and broad measures such as 
attendance rates to measure it, though he does mention the need to consider policy 
design in detail. I agree, and this is what my research intends to pursue.  
Third, if the relationship between education policy and social democracy (in 
general, government ideology) has scarcely been studied, this is particularly true in 
the case of Southern Europe; there is virtually no work on this question with regard 
to social democracy in these countries. The main effort in Southern Europe, where 
these fields are not very developed, has been with the welfare state [See: Esping-
Andersen 1994; Castles 1994]. For this paper I have chosen the study of French 
education policy. So, this study could contribute to the literature on social 
democracy and Southern European social democracy in particular.  
As Castles [1989] points out, the absence of studies on education policy may 
be due to the separation of education from other aspects of welfare. Education plays 
a role in fostering opportunities for social mobility (equality of opportunities), whilst 
other aspects of welfare, such as pensions, or health care, promote equality of 
condition. But for this reason in particular, education policy must be considered 
more carefully in the future.  
Fourth, both sociologists and economists have paid much more attention to 
education policy than political scientists, though in different ways. In relation to the 
subject of this research the two disciplines have centred on the following. Sociology 
has focused on social stratification or social mobility studies [see for the most 
recent studies: Blossfeld and Shavit 1993; Müller and Karle 1993; Allmendinguer 
1989; König and Müller 1986; for a very good overview see: Kerckhoff 1995]. 
Economists have mainly studied financial issues, and occasionally their relationship 
with equity (equality of access) and other dimensions of equality related to public 
expenditure [see, for example, the studies about different financial systems at 
university level: Wilson 1996; San Segundo 1994; studies of expenditure on 
education, whether public or private: San Segundo 1995; James 1993; studies about 
the redistributive impact of public expenditure on education: Bandrés 1990,1993; 
studies of equality of distribution of educational resources: Mingat and Tan 1985; Le 
Grand 1982]. Neither sociological nor economic studies have taken into account the 
relationship between education policy and governments, as political science is 
supposed to do, and as this research intends to. Nevertheless, a profound 
knowledge of these economic and sociological studies, as well as of the way their 
findings interrelate with each other, should certainly aid the definition of the 
dependent variable, egalitarian education policy, in terms which go beyond mere 
aggregate public spending.  
   
1.2.1. Education policy and equality  
The main dimensions, and their indicators, of the dependent variable of this 
research, egalitarian education policy, have been built taking into account two fields: 
on one hand, the study of the role of education policy in the stratification structure, 
and the study of the micro-theories of educational choice, both studied by 
sociologists; as well as, on the other hand, the contribution of the study of the 
economics of education to the analysis of education policy [9] . In general terms, the 
study of the role of education policy in the stratification structure as studied by 
sociologists has contributed to the development of the first dimension of egalitarian 
education policy: the organizational features of social selection. The economics of 
education has contributed to the improvement of the second main dimension: the 
financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources (the micro-theories 
of educational choice as studied by sociologists have been important for 
understanding the student choices along the educational life and the constraints 
imposed on these choices; for these micro-theories see mainly Gambetta 1987) [10] . 
The dimensions and indicators of the egalitarian education policy are as 
follows [11] :  
First dimension: organizational features of social selection. Indicators:  
? Comprehensitivity (number of years; or in other words, at what age tracking 
begins)  
? Tracking (in different schools, in the same schools or curricular differentiation 
in the same classrooms; extent of differentiation for future occupation in the 
labour market)  
? Opportunities for second thoughts (in the school system: segmentation 
between            tracks and/or points of union among them; and in life after 
school: adult education)  
? Compensatory education (rural, minorities, and so on)  
? Special education  
? Examinations, admission and orientation procedures, or other mechanisms that 
affect the general survival pattern (at what age they apply), or indicators such 
as years of compulsory education and enrolment rates at different levels and 
tracks  
Second dimension: financial aspects that facilitate access to educational resources. 
Indicators:  
? Public expenditure on education by levels and programs (compensatory and 
special education, for instance, as well as the funding for different education 
tracks)  
? Compatibility of education and work (above all in higher education)  
? Grants at post-compulsory non-university level  
? Indirect assistance to students (accommodation, books, restaurants, transport, 
and so on) by level of education: targeted or universal  
? Financial system for university level (widespread subsidized access, grants 
and/or loans: criteria for repayment mechanisms, aim of support: fees, living 
costs)  
? Homogenization of resources across regions and schools  
? Public-private sector of education by levels and tracks (extent of subsidies and 
homogenization of standards; social composition of both sectors.  
There is another very important dimension. This is the cultural capital-social 
capital dimension [12] . The policies that influence this, in general what have been 
called equality policies, or welfare state policies (though most obviously for the 
objective of this research those targeted to families with children rather than, for 
instance, those for pensioners), are important in order to fully analyse policies aimed 
at the equality of educational opportunities (i.e., equality both of access to and in the 
education system) [13] . So, an attempt to contextualize education policy within 
global considerations about equality and welfare state policies that those 
considerations imply is important for the aims of this research [14] .  
This model of egalitarian education policy is derived from Rivière’s and 
Rueda’s [1993] attempt to classify educational programs aimed at each dimension of 
equality (of access, conditions and results), and from its critique and development. 
These authors include the following indicators or programs in each dimension of 
equality: in equality of access they include two kinds of programs, programs for the 
distribution of educational resources across regions, and programs for giving grants 
to individuals; equality of conditions contains the program of comprehensitivity, that 
is, the number of years the students spend in a common track; finally, equality of 
results is achieved through three measures of positive discrimination as 
compensatory education, special education and adult education. Compensatory 
education is intended to compensate for social disadvantages in general, but it is 
aimed in particular at some specific “problems”: disadvantaged geographical 
location (rural zones), cultural minorities, drop-outs from compulsory education, 
failure at school in general, and so on.  
The critiques and developments made to this model are briefly the following 
[15] : First, it is interesting to know at what level of education the different programs 
apply. Second, more important than comprehensitivity is tracking. Tracking is the 
opposite of comprehensitivity, in other words it is the “degree of differentiation 
within given educational levels” [Allmendinger 1989:233] or within the education 
system in general; for example the division between general and vocational 
branches of education. For tracking it is not only important how many years there is 
a common core; apart from identifying “when” different tracks occur, it is also 
important to discern “how”, i.e. if tracking occurs in different schools, in the same 
schools or if there is curricular differentiation in the same classrooms, the extent of 
differentiation for future accupation in the labour market, if there are 
opportunities for second thoughts, in the school system, through segmentation 
between tracks or points of union among them, and in life after school, as in adult 
education [16] . Third, besides tracking, there are a number of other measures of 
social selection in the organizational structure of the education system.These are 
also treated in the sociological literature mentioned above (see for instance Müller 
and Karle 1993). These are examinations and general admission procedures, or other 
kind of mechanisms that affect the general survival pattern depending on the point at 
which they are applied in an educational career. They are important because, like 
tracking, social selection is greater at lower levels that at higher ones; if this kind of 
selection, by, for example, admission procedures, occurs early in the educational 
process, social selection will be higher, and viceversa. Some specific measures such 
as the duration of compulsory education and enrolment rates (at different levels) can 
account for this. Fourth, compensatory and special education are also included 
among the organizational features of social selection (adult education was 
previously included also).The reason for this is that although the separation of 
equality of conditions and equality of results may be valid, I think they are 
interrelated as a result of the organizational features of social selection of education 
policy. Fifth, economists, as noted before, have frequently examined financial 
matters. There are two financial aspects that are of importance for this research: 
issues relating to public expenditure on education, and the distinction and/or 
interrelation between private and public sectors in education. In terms of the first 
issue, and as stressed throughout the paper, general public expenditure on 
education is obviously not considered in itself to be a factor of egalitarian education 
policy. However, the breakdown of this public expenditure into levels and programs 
does matter. And it matters mainly because of the redistributive impact those levels 
have (usually university education has a lower redistributive impact than primary or 
even secondary education) [17] . In this respect, it is important to know how 
university education is financed: through public subsidies for widespread access, 
through grants and/or widespread loans, and so on (loans, repayment mechanisms, 
as well as the purpose of support, fees and/or living costs, must certainly be taken 
into account) [18] . And it is important also to know the indirect assistance to 
students (such as accommodation, books, restaurants, transport) by level of 
education and the form it takes: whether targeted or universal. The programs for the 
distribution (and homogenization) of educational resources across regions (as well 
as across schools), and the programs for giving grants to individuals (as developed 
by Rivière and Rueda in its equality of access) are other financial aspects that 
facilitate access to educational resources related to public expenditure.The 
compatibility of education and work, above all in higher education, could be another 
indicator of this dimension, because it can compensate the opportunity costs of 
education. The second aspect, the distinction between the public and private sectors 
in education is important if it implies some kind of differentiation of standards (if the 
private sector is of a higher quality than the public one) and access to private 
education is class biased [19] . When a private sector exists, measures may be taken 
to homogenize quality (ratio of student per teacher, admission practices, and so on) 
in both sectors; most frequently when public money goes to private schools 
(subsidies).  
   
1.2.2. Governments, education policy and equality  
As commented above, analyses of social democratic governments have paid 
little attention to education policy. When they have shown interest in this question, it 
has been at the level of aggregate public expenditure on education or other crude 
measures, such as enrolment rates. Maravall [1995:175], using data from the works 
of Castles [1982] and Stephens [1979], argues that social democratic 
governments (until the eighties) increased public expenditure on education [20] . He 
goes on to conclude that under social democratic governments "access to university 
education increased; the education system as a whole was democratized. In general, 
it seems that social democracy promoted the equality of opportunities in Western 
Europe and did not only understand equality in meritocratic terms, as education 
expanded beyond the requirements of efficient social selection and provided for 
disadvantaged collectivities". Maravall presents data for the eighties from Garrett 
and Lange [1991] and Garrett [1993] to conclude that although international 
economic competition pushed public expenditure down in every country, a 
distinctive feature of social democratic governments was that they had higher social 
transfers and expenditure on civil consumption, including education. From this 
evidence, he concludes that social democracy tried to preserve "egalitarian 
principles" [Maravall 1995:183-184]. Boix [1994: 74-81] has recently presented further 
evidence in this respect. He argues that during the seventies government ideology, 
or partisanship, did not explain the evolution of public expenditure on education, but 
that, on the contrary, it did play a role during the eighties. On this evidence, backed 
up by reference to other supply-side economic policies, Boix claims that what 
differentiates left-wing governments from right-wing ones is their commitment to 
"equality": "Beyond preferences over prices and jobs, what distinguishes social 
democrats and conservatives is the extent to which they are concerned about 
equality" (p.307). This may be true for the other policies he studies, but this 
conclusion is  not convincing for education. Public expenditure on education may be 
an indicator of a government's commitment to education, but it is by no means proof 
of a commitment towards equality in education.  
Exploring the notion of equality (most explicitly, the idea of equality of 
opportunities that education refers to) as conceived by social democrats and 
conservatives, we may also identify some general characteristics of the two models 
of partisan preferences [21] . In a reflection on social democracy and equality, 
Maravall [1993:11-12] writes: "A meritocratic conception of equality of opportunities 
proves too narrow. The socialist view of equality of opportunities is a broader one: it 
is based on the assumption that everybody has the same right to personal 
development derived from the same human equality. (...). This conception of equality 
of opportunities does not overlook natural inequalities, it confronts the problem of 
differences in inherent capabilities, it does not take as given the rules of the game 
and its goals". Jonsson [1990:139] describes the motives of the reforms made by the 
social democrats in Sweden that began in the mid-fifties, under Olof Palme, as 
follows: "The most prominent equalization goals, relating to the individual, were: the 
possibility for every one to develop his/her inner capabilities (whether theoretical or 
practical), freedom of choice, e.g., the possibility to go into higher education 
irrespective of earlier choices, reducing certain handicaps by compensatory 
education, and, weakening of the dependence of educational attainment on socio-
economic origin, regional background, and sex".  
For Herrero y Rodríguez de Miñón [1993:68-70], in a review of the conservative 
vision of equality, equality of opportunities is conceived in strictly meritocratic 
terms. He quotes the Napoleonic expression that conservatives defend: "La carrière 
ouverte aux talents", that implies that "every body must have the opportunity to 
reach the level his or her own capabilities allow" (p.70). So, in constrast to social 
democrats, conservatives do not try to compensate for natural inequalities, 
differences in inherent capabilities. This compensation can lead to "investment 
measures that penalize talented people, either by lowering general levels of general 
and vocational education, or by opting for the least gifted or advantaged, for the sole 
reason that they are so" (p.70).  
In contrasting the dimensions and indicators developed for the egalitarian 
education policy with the different ideological views we can identify the following 
specific differences in their education polices:  
First, social democrats, more than conservatives, design the organizational features 
of social selection in education policy with the following characteristics:  
? tracks or branches at a later age in educational life,  
? less differentiated tracks,  
? more opportunities for second thoughts (in the education system or in after 
schooling, through adult education),  
? more compensatory education,  
? more special education  
? examinations and admission procedures, or other mechanisms that affect 
general survival pattern, at later ages, or indicators such as more years of 
compulsory education and higher enrolment rates at lower levels.  
Second, social democrats, more than conservatives, design the financial aspects 
that allow for access to educational resources with the following characteristics:  
? more public expenditure on compulsory, and even on non-compulsory 
secondary education (also in comparison to public expenditure on university 
education),  
? more public expenditure on compensatory or special education, or in programs 
that lower social selection,  
? compatibility of education and work allowed (above all in higher education),  
? grants at post-compulsory education levels,  
? indirect assistance to students on a targeted basis,  
? grants and/or loans with flexible repayment conditions that cover opportunity 
costs of higher education,  
? in case of the decentralization of education policy, mechanisms to homogenize 
resources across regions and schools.  
? if a private sector exists, subsidies and homogenization of standards,  
The starting point for the development of a social democratic egalitarian 
model of education policy seems to be "the same right to personal development 
derived from the same human equality" (in contrast to a conservative meritocratic 
model of education policy). I have argued throughout this paper that each 
educational level may imply different dimensions of equality, so it is important to 
break down the social democratic egalitarian model into levels. In this ideal model 
compulsory education can be rooted in the concept of citizenship that T.H. Marshall 
developed [22] . Having a determined level of education is conceived as a right-duty 
of every citizen. At the same time, as can be derived from Marshall statements, 
compulsory education has to be comprehensive, in order to avoid creating different 
kinds of citizenship (with different values attached). Different kinds of citizenship can 
also be derived from marked heterogeneity of educational standards by regions, 
schools or sectors (mainly with regard to public funding). Compensatory education 
has to apply at this level in order to assure that everybody reaches this compulsory 
level and to prevent students from dropping out before they complete compulsory 
education (failure at school). In post-compulsory education things become 
more blurred. Egalitarian arguments in favour of comprehensitivity vanish the higher 
one goes up the educational ladder. There is another argument that applies to this 
post-compulsory (but not university) level; this is that too much comprehensitivity 
increases drop-out rates from the educational system, with the social consequences 
associated with this. So some differentiation of branches can inhibit drop-outs from 
the educational system. Nevertheless, opportunities for second thoughts have to be 
guaranteed both in the education system and also after leaving it. In both post-
compulsory non-universitary and universitary levels, a grants system (targeted on 
need), rather than universal publicly funded access, has to be the main financial tool. 
This has mainly been attemped at the university level, but empirically there is 
virtually no country that has adopted this system. There is a "second best" optimum 
for social democrats, however; this consists of an egalitarian compulsory and post-
compulsory system of education with correspondingly less social selection that 
leads to equality of access to university (assuring that the cost of opportunity, living 
costs, and so on, are covered in case of need at this later level). In this model public 
funding of university is not regressive, as university students come from different 
classes and not just from the higher ones. In this second scenario, and if it is 
necessary, compatibility of education and work has to be allowed in order to 
compensate for opportunity costs of studying.  
   
2. FRENCH EGALITARIAN EDUCATION POLICY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
The comparison of France with other countries, in this case the member 
countries of the European Union [23] , is important in order to know with 
characteristics of French egalitarian policy are shared by the majority of countries, 
and wich are peculiar to France or a subset of these countries that contains France.  
For the organizational features of social selection the comparison is made 
from the lowest to highest level of education, containing a description of the main 
features and giving data whenever relevant. Table 1 shows the average duration of 
pre-school education and its theoretical duration for member states in 1992-93. In 
France children, attended pre-schools for 3.36 years on average, the highest average 
along with Belgium and Denmark. The United Kingdom and Greece had the lowest 
averages (around 1 year). If this is contrasted with the theoretical duration of pre-
school education for every country we find some differences. In France the 
theoretical duration of pre-school education was 4 years, so its average duration was 
not very far from its theoretical duration. One of the most striking cases is Finland, 
that had a theoretical duration of pre-school education of 6 years and an average 
duration of 1.6 years. Sweden had the same theoretical duration of pre-school 
education as France, but its average duration was 2.5 years. These three countries 
(France, Finland and Sweden) had by far the highest theoretical duration. The lowest 
corresponds to the Netherlands (1 year), but its average duration (0.99) was higher 
that in other countries with higher theoretical durations; for instance Northern 
Ireland had an average of 0.39 years, when its theoretical duration was of 2 years.  
Table 2 provides information about compulsory education (usually primary 
and lower secondary education) in every country in 1994 in order to know its length 
and the comprehensitivity at this level, taking into account the age of initial 
assessment and guidance.  It is comprised of: compulsory education, end of 
compulsory education and initial educational guidance. As regards compulsory 
education, countries differ in its duration. The maximum is Germany and North 
Ireland, with 12 years length (though in Germany it is from 6 to 18 years old and in 
North Ireland from 4 to 16 years old) [24] . The minimum is Italy and Spain pre-reform 
with 8 years length (from 6 to 14 years old) [25] . The earliest age for the beginning of 
compulsory education is 4 years old as in Northern Ireland or Luxembourg, 
and the latest is 7 years old, as in Denmark. The earliest age of finalising compulsory 
education is 14 years old, as in Spain pre-reform and in Italy, and the latest is 18 
years old as in Germany (as before, in Belgium also, but from 15 years old has part-
time education). France has average values: compulsory education from 6 to 16 
years old, so 10 years length [26] . The forms of assessment at the end of 
compulsory education and the forms of initial educational guidance before or at the 
end of compulsory education are difficult to compare across member states because 
they differ greatly. The minimum age of initial guidance is 10 years old, as in 
Germany. In Luxembourg and Ireland it is 12 years old, and in the Netherlands 13 
years old [27] . On the other hand, the maximum age of initial guidance is age 16 (in 
Denmark, though with optional guidance courses from the age of 14; in Spain post-
reform; and in United Kingdom, though with guidance courses between 14 and 16). 
In Spain post-reform and in Italy, the end of compulsory education coincides with the 
initial educational guidance age (in Denmark, Greece and United Kingdom it does 
too, but with the possibility to have guidance courses from an earlier age). In France 
this age is 14 years, again around the average, and as most other countries, before 
completing compulsory education. At the end of compulsory education there are 
countries, as for instance Denmark or Spain post-reform, where there are no general 
examinations and a school leaving certificate is given independently of the level 
attained by the pupil; and there are countries (the majority I should say) that by 
examinations and/or certificates differentiate between kind of students, as for 
instance Greece, Ireland, and Luxembourg. France shows a considerable degree of 
tracking at the end of compulsory education, as in order to complete it, the last year 
has to be spent either in the traditional lycée or in a vocational lycée, and not in the 
collège (common for all) [28] . Table 3 shows a classification of countries of Europe 
depending of the organisation of its system of lower secondary education in 1993. 
The countries can be grouped in three categories: single continuous system, 
common core curriculum / common general education, and finally, differentiated 
branches or types of education. Within the first category, with the most 
comprehensive education systems, are the four Scandinavian countries. Within the 
last category, the least comprehensive education systems, are the countries of 
central Europe and Ireland. Within the second category, the not completely 
comprehensive education systems, are countries such as France, the other four 
Southern-European countries, the United Kingdom, and Iceland. Table 4 shows the 
forms of assessment in the member states by level of education in 1994. In France 
there is no final certificate or final examination in primary education, as in the 
majority of countries. The most extreme cases are Luxembourg and Northern 
Ireland, where there is a national examination in primary education for purposes of 
selection and guidance. For lower secondary education France has a final certificate 
with external examination. The assessment in lower secondary education in the rest 
of countries varies greatly. For upper secondary general education, France has a 
final certificate drawn up after external tests like the majority of countries [29] . Table 
5 shows data for enrolment rates by age for member countries and for the year 1992. 
These data are interesting in order to know the general survival pattern in every 
country. The table can be divided into three parts: years from 2 to 7; years from 14 to 
24; (years 22-25) and years 26-29. France has very high enrolment rates in 
comparative terms for years from 2 to 7. For 3 and 4 years old France had the 
highest enrolment rate of the member states, and for 2, 5, 6 and 7 years it was among 
the highest. For 2 years old it was only behind Belgium. There are some striking 
tendencies within these years among countries. The Scandinavian member 
countries, such as Sweden, Denmark or Finland, had very low enrolment rates in 
comparative terms for these years. For instance, whereas France and other countries 
had 100% enrolment rate or a figure near to this one at 5 years old, Finland had only 
32% of the age group in education, Sweden 60.6%, and Denmark 61.1%. For 
the years from 14 to 24, France has enrolment rates more or less similar to the 
average of member countries. At 20 years old, less than the half of this age group 
was studying. The most striking facts for member countries are the following: the 
Scandinavian member states for these years do not behave in the same way; 
whereas Denmark and Finland have very high enrolment rates, the highest of 
member states (24.2% and 27% respectively for 24 years old), Sweden surprisingly 
has only 24.3% of 20 years olds studying. The most extreme case of reduction in 
number of students at these years is Great Britain. At 17 years old, little more of half 
(56.7%) of the age group is studying in this country. Greece also follows this pattern 
of a minority of students in higher ages; its enrolment rate at 17 years old was only 
61.4%. Spain is also a perplexing country, because from 15 years old to 16 years old 
enrolment rates dropped from 91% to 75.6%; but then, from 20 to 24 yeas old this 
country is not among the countries with the lowest enrolment rates. The aggregation 
of enrolment rates in two groups for the higher ages (22-25 and 26-29) only confirms 
the tendencies commented above. Denmark and Finland have the highest enrolment 
rates, France more or less the average, and United Kingdom and Greece the lowest. 
Table 6 shows the data for general and vocational upper secondary education tracks 
in member states for 1992. With this table we can have an idea of the degree of 
tracking in every country. The EU average was 59.04% in vocational education and 
40.96% in general education [30] . But countries are very different in this dimension. 
France is little above the average for general education (44.72% in general education 
and 55.28% in vocational education). Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Sweden have very high (above 70%) rates of vocational education. On the contrary, 
Ireland and Portugal show very high rates for general education (above 70%). 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal are the countries with more than half of the 
students at upper secondary education in the general track [31] .  
For the second dimension, the financial aspects that facilitate access to 
educational resources, comparative information and data on public expenditure, 
financial systems for university level as well as some indicators in order to know the 
importance of private education along the different countries of the European Union, 
are provided.  
Table 7 shows figures for public expenditure on education in member states in 
1992. Public expenditure on education per pupil as a percentage of per capita GDP in 
France was well below the average of member countries; it only spends 31.1% of its 
GDP. France only surpasses Spain with 29.4% of its GDP. The countries with higher 
expenditure per pupil are United Kingdom (65.6%), Finland (59.7%), Ireland (56.9%), 
and the Netherlands (51.5%). Table 8 breaks down previous figures by level of 
education. France spends more on secondary education than on other level; for 
instance, public expenditure on education per pupil as a percentage of per capita 
GDP was 29.3% for secondary education (followed by higher education with 23.7%, 
primary education with 15.5% and pre-primary education with 14%). Scandinavian 
member countries, above all Finland and Sweden score higher than all other member 
states in terms of public expenditure on education per pupil for every level (Denmark 
for pre-primary and primary education). Austria, contrary to Denmark, has higher 
percentages for secondary and higher education, and Italy only for econdary 
education. If we take into account that France was among the countries with far 
highest enrolment rates in pre-primary education, the conclusion at this level could 
be that France has much more pupils in pre-primary education than other countries 
but endow them with less public money (compare France that spends 14% of per 
capita GDP per pupil on pre-primary education with the Scandinavian countries, that 
spend an average of 38%).  
Table 9 shows data for the forms of revenue of higher education institutions in 
some of the member states, including France. In 1984 higher education 
institutions in this country received 89.5 % of their funds from public sources, 4.7 % 
from fees and 5.8 % from other sources. France is the country with the highest 
percentage of revenue of higher education institutions derived from public funds; the 
next country, Finland obtained 85% of  revenue from public funds in 1987, and 
universities in United Kingdom in 1986-87, the lowest, with 55% of  revenues from 
public funds. Nevertheless, the French figures for fees are not the lowest, as 
Germany did not get revenues from fees in 1986 and Finland obtained a minimum 
income from this source in 1986. The reason why this is so is that the percentage 
derived from other kinds of revenues is among the lowest in France, in comparison 
with Germany, for instance. In the mid-80s, in contrast, higher education institutions 
in Spain obtained 20% of their income from fees. Table 10 shows the systems of 
financial assistance to students in higher education in France and in some member 
states. France shares with Greece and Portugal a system mainly consisting of 
subsidies and indirect assistance. Every country differs in this respect. Compared to 
countries other than those of Southern Europe, France does poorly in terms of the 
other indicators of financial assistance to students. The percentage of this 
assistance of GDP is 0.08%, whereas in other countries it is at least above 0.1%, and 
United Kingdom spends 0.3% of its GDP on this kind of assistance. The maximum 
assistance per student is also low in comparison to other countries (2,009 dollars in 
France, as compared to the average of 4,000 in other countries in the table). The 
average assistance per student is low, with only 200 dollars, and the same occurs 
with the percentage of beneficiaries, only 18%, well below the countries other than 
the Southern European ones (except for Greece). The data on Table 11 now refers to 
systems of grants at the higher level of education for member states and for the year 
1993. In France there are tuition fees for students who go to university. The majority 
of member states also have tuition fees, except for Denmark, Germany, Greece and 
Luxembourg. France has a mix of grants and loans as the main form of financial 
support, as every member country has, except for Spain and the Flemish Community 
in Belgium, that only have grants. In France this support depends on the income of 
students, of parents, or of the spouse, depending on the case. This criterium is also 
applied in other countries, except for Denmark and the Netherlands (for the basic 
grant) where the percentage of all students receiving direct assistance is 100% or 
nearly 100% [32] . In France direct assistance also depends on academic criteria, as 
in every member state with the exception of Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and Portugal. I have already commented on the percentage of students receiving 
direct assistance for the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Denmark; except for 
these countries, in the rest the percentages are lower. In France it was only a +/- 
18%, among the lowest (the lowest by far was Italy with 2.5% of students receiving 
direct assistance). In all countries, including France, the amount of direct assistance 
depends on income and/or place of residence. In France there are other social 
benefits such as exemptions from tuition fees in the public sector or tax allowances 
for travelling expenses. Every country has its own different social benefits of this 
kind, except for Denmark. Among the most popular are family allowances, tax 
allowances, and reductions in tuition. Table 12 shows the existing student loan 
programmes in some member states. France has a repayment system, based on a 
mortgage loan, similar to the majority of countries (except for Sweden, that has an 
income contingent loan). For France, as for the other countries the  purpose of 
support is  living. But the main difference between  France and the other countries is 
that the percentage of students with loans is only 1% in France, compared to 30% in 
Germany, or 44% in the United Kingdom. The average loan, as well as the year when 
the scheme began, differs in each country (unfortunately there is no data for France).
Table 13 shows the enrolments in public and private education by level of 
education in member countries and for the year 1992. There are two kinds of 
indicators for this: the percentage of enrolments by institution and enrolments 
in private education as a percentage of total enrolments by level of education. The 
first indicator, the percentage of enrolments in public and private (grant-aided and 
non grant-aided) sectors, shows that France is among the countries with highest 
percentage of enrolments in public institution (Scandinavian countries are higher). 
On the contrary the Netherlands and Belgium have the least. With the second 
indicator, the enrolments in private education as a percentage of total enrolments by 
level of education, we can see for France a higher percentage of private education 
for secondary education (21%) than for primary education (15%) and for pre-primary 
education (12%). The member countries differed very significantly as regards this 
indicator. There are countries with very high proportions of private education for 
every level, such as Ireland (though there is no data for secondary education), the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and to a lesser extent Spain. There are countries with very low 
proportions of private education for every level, such as the Scandinavian member 
countries: Finland, Sweden, Denmark, but not only them; the United Kingdom and 
Greece also had very low proportions. There are countries with remarkable 
differences between pre-primary education (very high proportions) and primary and 
secondary education (very low proportions) as is the case of Portugal, Italy and 
Austria. To conclude, Table 14 shows data for the distribution of  public expenditure 
by kind of institution and level of education in member states in 1992. The 
distribution of public expenditure by kind of institution is coherent with enrolments 
in public and private institutions. By level this distribution hardly varies. Higher 
education is the level at which public expenditure (in contrast to private expenditure) 
is highest (90.5%), in contrast to secondary education (82%). The other countries 
vary in this respect.  
France presents a number of peculiarities that other member countries do not 
share, or at least the majority of them do not. Enrolment rates and the theorical 
duration of pre-school education are very high in France, though public expenditure 
per pupil at this level is very low. In terms of compulsory education, France belongs 
to the set of countries with a medium degree of tracking; nevertheless, the final year 
of compulsory education has to be spent in different kinds of schools depending on 
the track: traditional (general and technological) and vocational. For upper 
secondary (not compulsory) education, the degree of tracking is lower than for lower 
secondary education. Public expenditure per pupil is very low. The revenues of 
higher education institutions principally consist of public funds, and to a much 
greater extent than in other countries, although fees are not among the lowest. 
Financial assistance to students is poor in comparison to other countries (except for 
the South European ones), as is evident in indicators such as the percentage of 
students with grants, the average assistance per student, and so on. The percentage 
of students with loans is also minimal. France is among the countries with the lowest 
pecentage of enrolments in private institutions, and public expenditure by 
institutions (for private, grant-aided) is coherent with this indicator.  
   
3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF EGALITARIAN EDUCATION POLICY IN FRANCE  
   
3.1. EDUCATION POLICY AND EQUALITY BEFORE 1981  
When the Parti Socialiste arrived in power in 1981, the left had not been in 
power since the II World War. The IVth Republic and the “period of parties” in 1958 
was followed by the Vth Republic. From this date until 1981, the President of the 
Republic was conservative, but the nature of the governments was not: they were 
mainly coalitions. This section will outline education policy towards equality within 
this long period; its relevance for this paper largely lies in the importance of the 
legacy left by these governments (as well as, if relevant, by earlier ones) to the 
governments of different colours in the eighties and nineties.  
As regards the first dimension of education policy, organizational features of 
social selection, this period is very important [33] . During this period France 
transformed its dual and selective system into a comprehensive-unified one [34] . Its 
education system became “democratic” [35] . The previous system was a dual one; 
one non-selective track (for the masses), and another selective track (for elites). 
There was early selection for entry into the elite sector [36] . In the non-selective 
track, primary schooling covered more than elementary education [37] . The 
Certificat d’Études Primaires (primary schooling certificate) was followed by the 
Enseignement Primaire Supérieur (higher primary schooling) in Écoles Primaires 
Supérieures (EPS) (senior primary schooling) or in Cours Complementaires 
(complementary courses). In the selective track, children entered lycées for the 
elementary education and continued there in secondary education [38] . From the 
age of six onwards, the more affluent classes sent their children to the lycées, while 
the children of working classes attended primary schools. The move from primary 
schools to lycées was possible, but normally took place at the age of eleven, or not 
at all. Children of humble social origin usually stayed in elementary schools for the 
higher primary certificate, or transferred to short-cycle vocational programs 
(complementary courses). Secondary education overlapped and competed with the 
primary schools. The teacher of primary education had the last word with respect to 
working class children trying to go on  (if they were successful in the exam) to 
secondary education (lycées) or continuing in primary schools [39] .  
After 1958 onwards [40] , the first fundamental reform was in 1959, the first of 
a number of  reforms in the structure of the education system. This reform, the so-
called  Debré-Berthoin Law, attempted to create a common core  and an observation 
cycle (trying to unify primary schools and lycées, though keeping them as separated 
establishments). Two decrees after the 1959 Law created a two-year observation 
cycle in the 6th and 5th grades [41] , paving the way for a gradual extension of the 
school-leaving age to 16 (rather than 14). Within this observation period, the 
differentiation between “classical” and “modern” tracks was introduced almost from 
the beginning (the second semester of the first year). Moreover, the observation 
cycle took place in the same establishments as the “common core”, either in primary 
education, secondary education or in the complementary courses, renamed Collèges 
d’Enseignement Géneral (CEG) (colleges of general education). The exam for 
transition from the primary school to the  lycée was abolished. In 1963, with the 
Fourchet reform, a comprehensive lower secondary school was created, putting 
back the moment of decisive orientations for two years. Between the observation 
cycle and the decisive threshold in the 2nd grade (first year of upper secondary 
education at age 16), the 4th and 3rd grades constituted an “orientation cycle”. 
These two cycles took place alongside each other in autonomous establishments, 
though there was a difference between the CEGs, assigned to primary education, 
and the new Collèges d’Enseignement Secondaire, CES (colleges of secondary 
education), that formed part of secondary education. The CES had four parallel 
streams: classical, long modern, short modern, and another for students with 
difficulties. The CEG had only the last three branches.  
The definitive unification at lower levels of education took place with the Haby 
Law in 1975, the completion of a unifying process from 1963, that largely abolished 
tracking by ability in the collège, at least in law if not always in practice. From 1963 
to 1975 the students were progressively separated by ages, and not as previously by 
classes; primary education in écoles élémentaires, lower secondary education in 
CEGs and CESs, gradually more similar, and upper secondary education in lycées. 
The law unified the CEGs and the CESs, abolished all distinctions between them, and 
converted both into simple collèges (for lower secondary education). The 
technical baccalauréat was created in 1971 [García Garrido 1993:238].  
As regards higher education, the Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (IUT) 
were created in 1966, these were vocational short courses included in universities, 
though of a selective nature, in competition with other non-selective university long 
studies [García Garrido 1993:238].  
For the second dimension, the financial aspects that facilitate access to 
educational resources, this period is specially significant as the relationship 
between public and private sectors of education is profoundly reshaped. The 
characteristics of the private sector of education and its relationship with the public 
sector were defined in this period through a number of laws and measures [42] . At 
the end of the IVth Republic in the fifties, the private sector of education was in 
crisis, mainly due to the lack of teachers from the religious orders (the majority of 
private schools were religious) and the increased costs that these schools faced in 
paying the salaries of secular teachers [43] . The first and most important law 
affecting this field came in 1959, the Debré Law. This law gave private 
establishments the possibility of joining the public sector. This meant specifically 
two kinds of contracts: the contract of association (le contrat d’association) and the 
simple contract (le contrat simple). The difference between the two was related to the 
degree of subsidies (more in the first type) and the extent of regulation of education 
(again greater in the first type). In associated schools the teachers were under the 
direct control of the state and the schools had to meet a “recognized educational 
need”. With both types of contracts, parents had to pay a school fee, which was 
higher in the case of schools under simple contracts than in schools under 
association contracts, where, moreover, there was a limit imposed by the state. The 
second type of contract was intended to disappear gradually. Nevertheless, in 1971, 
under the presidency of Pompidou, the simple contract was allowed to continue and 
even promoted. The culmination of this process came in 1977 with the Guermeur 
Law, that loosenned state control of contract schools and enhanced funding to these 
schools [44] .  
  
3.2. THE FIRST SOCIALIST PERIOD  
The Socialist Party won power in 1981. Though they had been allied with 
communists during the election campaign, they won a majority of votes. The 
Socialist party enjoyed full control of both the executive and legislative branches of 
government; nevertheless, from 1981 to 1984 it governed with the Parti Communiste 
(PC), although it did not have to do so. The objectives of the PS for education in 1977 
defined its first goal as “the fight against social and educational 
inequalities” [Savary 1985:11].  
As regards the structural dimension [45] , one of the first egalitarian measures 
the government took was to launch a compensatory education program that 
provided extra resources to disadvantaged areas with special necessities Zones 
d’Éducation Prioritaire, ZEPs (education priority areas). This was almost the only 
egalitarian reform that was successfully implemented by the first Minister of 
Education, Alain Savary. Apart from the most obvious defeat of the measures with 
respect to private education that this Minister suffered, which will be commented 
below, the Savary proposal for the reform of higher education in 1983 was another 
story of  failure. This reform contained measures trying to unify higher education, 
emphasizing the assimilation of elitist branches such as the Cours Preparatoires aux 
Grandes Écoles (CPGE) and grandes écoles into the university structure, as well as 
revitalizing continuing and professional education. These measures, specially the 
former were dropped from the final law. This impasse of the reform of the 
organization of the French education system was clearly agains Savary’s will. 
Some reports highlight the fact that there were some organisational features of  the 
education system that he wanted to change [García Garrido 1993:240-241]. In early 
1983, the Legrand report “Pour un collège démocratique” (for a democratic lower 
secondary school) pointed to the need to unify further the educational system [46] . 
In late 1983, the Prost report “The lycées and their study at the threshold of the XXI 
century” pointed to the need to improve the education for every body [47] . But these 
reforms were not implemented [48] . In 1985 the Carraz Law created the professional 
bac (bac professionnel), which was further defined in a decree in 1986 [see Conseil 
de l’Europe 1988:68-70]. The second Minister of Education, Jean-Pierre 
Chèvenement, after the defeat of his predecessor in 1985, took a different approach. 
He did not continue with the measures that Savary had tried but failed to implement, 
and he even ignored the compensatory policy to the ZEPs. But he started to phase 
out the short-cycle vocational programs right from the beginning, and launched the 
slogan of the “80% age group at the level of bac”. This slogan was just an 
expansionist target, which was not very significant in itself for equality goals. He 
started revamping many technical secondary school programs and creating a host of 
new professionally-oriented programs within the universities [Ambler 1995/96?:222] 
[49] .  
As regards the financial dimension of equality in French education policy, this 
socialist period is very interesting, above all for the relationship between the state 
and private education and the configuration of the public-private system of 
education in France [50] . When the socialists came to power, Savary, the Minister of 
Education, had the task of integrating the private sector of education inside the 
public sector. Historically the PS adhered to the secular premise “à l’école publique, 
fonds publics; à l’école privée, fonds privés” (public funds for public schools, 
private funds for private schools) [Savary 1985:12]. The objectives for the PS in 
education policy in 1977 contained the following aim: “the creation of a public, 
single, and secular service of national education gradually integrating through 
negotiation subsidised private schools” [Savary 1985:11].  As Savary himself 
declared, this proposition, as well as the rest, “were not prepared and written by the 
education delegation inside the Socialist Party, but by the team in charge of writing 
the presidential campaign, people characterised by an encyclopaedic view without 
being informed of educational problems” [Savary 1985:14]. During the presidential 
campaign in 1981 the opposition of Mitterrand diffused among the private schools 
the fear that if he won he would cut subsidies to private schools and close them. In a 
letter during the campaign Mitterrand reaffirmed the principle of creating a public, 
single, and secular service of national education, and stated clearly that this was 
going to be gradually adopted and as a result of negotiation (“through persuasion 
and not compulsion”), with guarantees for private schools [Savary 1985:15-16]. So 
Savary, a skilled diplomat of the socialist party, was in charge of persuading and not 
compelling. He spent two years talking, listening and, negotiating with different 
groups of the educational spectrum, above all with private and religious education 
groups. Savary presented five proposals as the basis for negotiation [Ambler 
1985a:130-131]: first, lay teachers from subsidized private schools would be 
incorporated into the civil service, along with public schools teachers, but the clergy 
would continue to teach under contract; second, these private schools would be 
incorporated in the carte scolaire, an overall plan for the creation and location of 
schools; third, these établissements d’intérêt public (establishments of public 
interest) would be run by administrative councils representing the state and local 
government, as well as the sponsoring association, which would continue to own the 
buildings; fourth, families would be allowed to choose freely from all schools in the 
area, subject to review by a committee of school principals, teachers and parents; 
and fifth, each school (or set of schools) would be allowed to select a particular 
focus, spiritual, cultural, or athletic [51] . After the negotiations, in the project 
prepared for the Savary Bill there were some concessions to the private schools, or 
at least the radical sector of education that was pro “private funds to private schools 
and public funds to public schools” perceived it in this way. For this reason, the 
National Assembly added tough amendments to the bill. Savary warned that these 
amendments could destroy any chance of compromise with Catholic education 
groups. In 1984, after demonstrations in favour of private schools, François 
Mitterrand withdrew the amended Savary bill. After this defeat Savary left the 
ministry and was replaced by Jean-Pierre Chèvenement [52] . He was instructed to 
“restore peace” [Ambler 1995/96?:215], which meant abandoning almost every 
measure that Savary’s project had contained. Public opinion studies revealed a 
majority in favour of subsidized private schools, often even among the socialist 
electorate. The political costs of incorporating subsidized private schools into the 
public system were too great to continue with the old socialist and secular promise 
that most members of socialist party and their militants had supported [53] .  
   
3.3. TWO YEARS OF CONSERVATIVE COALITION IN GOVERNMENT: 1986-1988  
In March 1986 a coalition between the Union pour la Democratie Fraçaise 
(UDF), a centre party with a liberal tradition, and a right-wing party from the gaullist 
tradition, the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR), won power (Jacques Chirac 
being the Prime Minister). The President of the Republic was still a Socialist, Fraçois 
Mitterrand. It was a period of “cohabitation”. The Minister of Education in this period 
was René Monory.  
Right at the very beginning of his mandate, Chirac confirmed the target of 
acheaving 80% of the age group at the level of baccalauréat announced at the end of 
the previous Socialist government [Conseil de L’Europe 1988:77-78]. The Minister of 
Education, Monory, lowered this target in his “Plan for the national education” to 
74% of the age group at the level of baccalauréat by the year 2,000 [García Garrido 
1993:241; Ambler 1995/96?:201]. So, this government was also in favour of 
expansionist measures in education as socialist government had been. As regards 
more specific egalitarian measures in education, the ideas of this government can 
best be exemplified by the following quote from Michèle Aliot-Marie, secretary of 
state in the Ministry of Education in this period: “...our present system is very 
egalitarian. It levels and excludes, in some way, those who are failing and those who 
should be progressing faster” [54] . René Monory, like his socialist predecessor, 
Chèvenement, ignored compensatory education (the programs aimed at ZEPs) 
[Ambler 1995/96?:218]. This period was not very fruitful in specific measures in 
education; one of these was the Devaquet Bill, in 1986, which took its name from 
Alain Devaquet, delegated Minister of research and higher education. The Devaquet 
Bill allowed individual universities to set admissions requirement beyond the bac, 
which gave them a very powerful instrument to choose their own students [Ambler 
1995/96?:219; Coseil de L’Europe 1988:82]. This law was followed by student 
protests because, in what corresponds to this structural dimension, at the same time 
as it allowed universities to choose their students, the diplomas of different 
universities were allowed to be different. In this sense students considered that the 
introduction of degrees that would differentiate the better students trained at the 
more prestigious campuses from other students would be unfair [Zirakzadeh 
1989:228-230]. After these protests the Bill was withdrawn in late 1986.  
Among the first objectives the government of Chirac had for education policy 
was the issue of the relationship between the public and private sectors of 
education, the relationship between the state and private education. There are three 
specific points: the equal treatment of private and public schools, freedom of choice 
in education for families, and fiscal deductions for private universities [Conseil 
de L’Europe 1988:77-78 and 82]. Apart from the third, the first two measures are 
rather vague. Nevertheless, these measures were not transformed into legal action. 
There was a consensus among the political elite that continued reform of higher 
education was needed for reasons of economic development. The Devaquet Bill 
previously commented on in terms of its structural dimension also contained 
financial reforms, establishing a moderate increase in university tuition and 
supplementary fees [55] . Some students feared that the rise would impose an 
unbearable financial burden on working-class and low-income families; in short, that 
the principle of free and equal access to education (higher education) would be 
violated. As commented above, the Devaquet Bill led to demonstrations by students, 
who saw how the economy was in crisis and youth unemployment had grown from 
the 13% in 1979 to 39% in 1986 [Zirakzadeh 1989:228-230].  
   
3.4. THE SECOND SOCIALIST PERIOD: 1988-1993  
After the very short period of centre-right coalition government, the 1988 
elections gave power again to the Socialist party, but in this case it had a minority 
government. Rocard replaced Chirac as Prime Minister. Lionel Jospin was the 
Minister of Education in this new era of socialism in France, and was only replaced 
in 1992 by Jack Lang. The Socialist Party organized several meetings about the 
education situation during its period in opposition. One of these meetings took place 
at the Sorbonne in May 1987, with the title “L’avenir des lycées et de l’enseignement 
supérieur” (The future of upper secondary and higher education). The future Minister 
of Education in 1988, who closed the debate, highlighted the classical egalitarian 
principles that might guide education policy, though in very vague terms. He 
emphasized some specific measures such as the diversification of “formes de 
l’excellence” in secondary and higher education (diversification of good quality 
secondary and higher education) but put great emphasis on allowing the reversal of 
past decisions. One example of this was to encourage links between universities and 
grandes écoles by establishing “footbridges” between them, through third cycles or 
research centres in common [Jospin 1987:3-6]. Jospin was in favour, as he declared 
in other places, of more systematic selection as the only way to decrease failure 
rates and to improve the prestige of universities [Ambler 1995/96?:219-220].  
Right after taking office in the Ministry of Education, Jospin launched a 
package of measures for urgent action. In first place was the following aim: “taking 
into account differences in order to promote equality of opportunities” [Conseil de 
L’Europe 1988:109-111; García Garrido 1993:242-244]. This general aim was followed 
by some specific actions. The actions towards the organisation of the education 
system were the following. The main measure in this field taken by the Socialist was 
the 1989 Law, “La Loi d’Orientation sur L’Education” (Law for orientation in 
education). The law contained egalitarian aims, but it was rather disappointing in 
terms of its concrete measures, with no organisational changes of much significance 
with respect to equality. Surprisingly, the emphasis was once again placed on an 
expansionist target: 100% of students of an age group should leave the education 
system with at least a secondary education certificate, at least the CAP (Certificat 
d’Aptitud professionnelle), a vocational aptitude certificate, or the BEP (Brevet 
d’Études Professionnelles), a vocational studies diploma; 80% of the students 
should study the bac; the guarantee of a school place for children aged three and 
over [56] . This law also contemplated the creation of IUP, Instituts Universitaires 
Professionnalisés (Profesionalized Universitary Institutes) [OCDE 1996:?; García 
Garrido 1993: 242-244; Ambler 1995/96?:201].  
The financial aspects of equality in education are not so central to the 
education policy in the second Socialist period as they were in the first 
Socialist period. Above all the debate around private education and the state in 
France was much less intense in comparison to the early eighties. Anyhow, there are 
some measures of what the Socialist did within this period from 1988 to 1993. I turn 
to this dimension now.  
The 1989 Law also referred to subsidized private education, which 
progressively became more similar to public education [OCDE 1996:?]. In 1990, with 
Jospin as Minister of Education, there were demonstrations of students in France 
against the education policy of the government; specifically the demonstrations 
were to demand more funds for staff  and to maintain overloaded secondary schools 
[Ambler 1995/96?:206; García Garrido 1993:242-244]. In 1991, still under Jospin, there 
was a project called “Universités 2000“ (Universities 2000) that included the intention 
to build 7 universities, 20 IUTs and the new IUPs introduced in the French university 
system in 1989 with the orientation law [García Garrido 1993:243]. But students 
demonstrations were very intense and Jospin was replaced by Lang in 1992. In 1992 
Jack Lang reached an agreement with the Catholic education sector over 
outstanding disagreements on financing [Ambler 1995/96?:215] [57] .  
   
3.5. THE SECOND CONSERVATIVE PERIOD: FROM 1993 TO 1997  
            In the 1993 elections the same kind of conservative coalition as in 1986 won 
power again. It was the second period of coexistence in the eighties and nineties 
with a socialist President of the Republic, François Mitterrand. At the beginning of 
this period François Bayrou was appointed Minister of Education.  
            François Bayrou declared in 1993 that “standards can be maintained, and 
students properly taught, only with traditional teaching methods and through 
placement of children in appropriate tracks, from the middle school onward”. He 
continued :“The collège unique (...) [the common school] was in fact the collège 
inique -the iniquitous or unjust college, for it failed to distinguish pupils according to 
ability” [Ambler 1995/96?:218]. In 1993 the government enacted a “Loi quinquenale 
sur l’emploi, le travail et la formation professionnelle” (Law for employment, the 
work and the vocational education). This law regulated the right of every student to 
some kind of vocational education before leaving the education system [OCDE 
1996:?]. In 1993, just when the new government came to power, the expansionist 
target (of 75% or 80% of the age group at the level of the baccalauréat) held by every 
government since the final years of first Socialist government (with Chèvenement) 
was taken as given, not discussed, and maintained [Ambler 1995/96?:201]. In 1995 
after the demonstrations against the government proposal to limit the number of 
students in IUTs, this kind of measure was withdrawn [Ambler 1995/96?:206].  
As regards the financial dimension of equality in education, the most 
remarkable event was the government’s bill in 1993-94 that de facto repealed the 
ancient Falloux Law (which restricted local government funding of private school 
construction), since it relaxed the restrictions on this. The left reacted to this 
measure and the bill was sent to the Constitutional Council and at the beginning of 
1994 the Council declared this law unconstitutional [Ambler 1995/96?:215,221] [58] .  
The model of partisan preferences of egalitarian education policy is not 
confirmed in the light of the evidence presented in this section, at least in terms of 
the historical development of laws, programs and measures by governments of the 
two colours. Since this research places special attention to social democratic 
parties, from the experience of the French Socialist Party we cannot confirm the 
model of social democratic preferences of egalitarian education policy. In the long 
period of the IVth Republic, a high degree of tracking in the education system was 
abolished. This period saw the introduction of the most important measures 
towards the comprehensitivity of the French education system. The President of the 
Republic was always a conservative, though the governments were coalitions. The 
Debré law, that tied subsidies to private schools to state control of schools, was also 
introduced in this period. Nevertheless, it is true that other mesures towards private 
schools were more coherent with the model proposed. We can make two important 
remarks eith respect to the first socialist period: first, in Mauroy’s government there 
are problems not of design but of implementation of the egalitarian education policy 
designed by Savary, except for compensatory education; and second, in Fabius’s 
government there is a change in preferences in almost every point [59] . One of the 
most clear changes in the design of the organization of the education system was 
the substitution of concrete measures to diminish social selection as Savary 
intended, by the expansionist goal Chèvenement launched when he substituted 
Savary. This change in preferences was not complete, and the implementation of 
(more timid) measures was sometimes more effective. Chèvenement made the 
education levels up to the level of bac more comprehensive through a variety of 
measures. In any event, the preferences of socialists, both before and after their 
change, about tracking are not clear; Chèvenement introduced more tracking in 
higher education, whilst in complete contrast Savary introduced tracking at the level 
of baccalauréat (for example, the creation of the vocational track of the bac was in 
1985). As regards the public-private issue, the change of preferences is evident. 
Again, initial government preferences are coherent with the model (taking public 
funds to private schools as given, subsidies imply a state control of private schools). 
Implementation of the state control of private schools failed and under the second 
government there is a change of strategy. The Chirac government did not 
substantially change the egalitarian education policy of socialists; the main lines 
were continued (for instance the target of the 80% of the age group at the level of 
baccalauréat). This is perhaps not very surprising given taht this was a period of 
coexistence with a socialist President. Nevertheless, there are some aspects of the 
design of this conservative government that differed from the previous socialist 
period, and some of these are coherent with our model of partisan preferences, 
though as before, they met problems of implementation: the failure to give fiscal 
deductions to private universities, or to increase fees in universities (this last 
measure could be coherent with the model of conservative preferences of egalitarian 
education policy as nothing is said about a parallel increase in grants). The second 
period of socialism studied again does not confirm our model of socialist 
preferences. The socialist government countinued with what the conservative 
government had done (again the expansionist target for baccalauréat is adopted). In 
any event, the electoral support of the socialist government from 1988 to 1993 was 
weak, it had a minority government. Some measures of this government were, 
nevertheless, different: it introduced more tracking at the higher level of education 
(against our hypothesis of partisan preferences); and, private education was 
increasingly more similar to public education throught this period (coherent with our 
hypothesis). And finally, the last conservative government also continued the 
previous line (above all the expansionist targets). The changes it introduced were 
merely marginal, as they have been in previous periods, and they ended as 
implementation failures. These consisted of the attempt to limit students in the 
selective vocational track of higer education and to increase public subsidies to 
private schools (both in accordance with our hypothesis).  
   
4. QUANTITATIVE FIGURES OF EGALITARIAN EDUCATION POLICY IN FRANCE  
The egalitarian dimensions and indicators of education policy that have been 
developed through the paper, are presented now as time series data with the aim of 
finding possible tendencies of egalitarian education policy outputs in France 
and, whenever possible, making comparisons betwen ideological periods.  
For the first dimension, the organizational features of social selection, some 
indicators of tracking in secondary and higher education are presented. Data for 
secondary education and for the years from 1960 to 1994 is in Table 15. In upper 
secondary education and baccalauréat the students are divided into two tracks: 
general and technical on one hand, and vocational on the other. The first one is 
selective and prestigious, unlike the second one. In upper secondary education the 
percentage of students in the prestigious track increased steadily, and that of the 
students in the non prestigious, vocational, track decreased constantly thoughout 
the whole period. Between 1985 and 1988 the increase was greater than in other 
periods (60% of the students in upper secondary education were in the prestigious 
track in 1985, whereas this figure increased to 67% in 1988). In complete contrast, at 
the level of the baccalauréat the vocational track increased its share steadily (mainly 
from 1990, or even 1988, to 1995; it increased from 2% of total number of students in 
the bac in 1988 to 15% in 1995). There are two facts that show the  general survival 
pattern in the French education system: first, the lower the level of education, the 
narrower the difference between tracks; second, the higher the level of education, 
the lower the number of students. The bac is a powerful filter to select students.  
Table 16 shows the tracks in higher eduaction.There are four main tracks in 
higher education: university (excluding IUT) of a non-selective character, IUT 
(university short vocationally oriented courses of a selective character), STS (non-
university short vocationally oriented courses in lycées of a non-slective character), 
CPGE (preparation classes for Grandes Écoles in lycées), and Grandes Écoles (a 
highly selective and prestigious non-university sector). University is by far the track 
with the highest percentage of students, followed by the track of grandes écoles. The 
percentage of students in university (without IUT) increased considerably from 1960 
to 1970 (from 69% of total students in higher education in 1960 to 75% in 1970). From 
1970 to 1993 this percentage decreased continuously, from 75% in 1970 to 63% in 
1995. The other non-prestigious track, STS, experienced the opposite tendency, as 
the percentage of students in this track increased constantly throughout the whole 
period (except for the last year), rising from 2% in 1960 to 11% in 1993. The 
percentage of students in CPGE decreased from 1960 to 1980 (from 7% to 3%) and 
then remained around this figure with ups and downs. The percentage of students in 
IUT experienced little variation; there was a tiny increase from 1970 to 1986 (from 3% 
to 5%), and also a tiny decrease from 1986 to 1993 (from 5% to 4%). The percentage 
of students in grandes écoles varied during the course of the period. It experienced a 
general decrease (from 21% of students in higher education in 1960 to 18% in 1993). 
So, while the percentage of students in every track decreased throughout the period, 
that in the STS track, the vocational non-prestigious education, increased.  
So, as regards tracking the model of partisan preferences that has been 
developed in the theoretical framework appears to of dubious validity, as the 
socialists in France have not clearly reduced tracking, and when they have done it, 
as in upper secondary education, previous and following conservative governments 
did the same. This expansion of vocational tracks, such as the vocational bac or the 
vocational non-prestigious track in higher education may respond to the 
“diversification of ways of excellence”, but concrete measures to increase the 
prestige of vocational tracks and concrete measures to form footbridges between 
the different tracks have been notable only for their absence.  
In terms of the second dimension, the financial aspects that facilitate access 
to educational resources, some indicators of grants and social assistance for higher 
education, of the distribution of resources across regions in France, and of the 
relative weight of public and private sectors in the French education system 
through time, will be provided. Some data for grants as contained in the volume 
Géographie de l’École edited by the French Ministry of Education. The percentage of 
students receiving grants fell after 1970; in 1970 they accounted for 40% of students, 
in 1980 for 28% of students, and in 1990 for 27% of students. This percentage for 
1990 varied in accordance with the level: 1 student out of 4 in secondary education 
and 1 student out of 7 in higher education; in accordance with the track (in 
secondary education): 37% in vocational second cycle, 25% in technological second 
cycle and only 17% in general second cycle. This figure also varied in accordance 
with the kind of institution: 30% in the public institutions and only 16% in private 
institutions and in accordance with the programme: more than 50% in special 
education. Table 17 shows the percentage of students receiving a grant based on 
social criteria by type of grant [60] . The percentage of people in the highest types of 
grants (the most needy) is always bigger than the other categories (see mainly type 
9). Between 1975 and 1980, and even 1981, the percentage of students with grants in 
higher types (less wealthy students) increased whereas that of students in lower 
types decreased. The system was more progressive in 1980 than in 1975. From that 
date the picture changed completely; students in higher types decrease and 
students in lower and middle types increase. In 1987 the system was more 
regressive than in 1980, and similar to 1975. Table 18 shows the percentage of 
students with grants in higher education by track from 1981 to 1987. The percentage 
of students with a grant in universities is throughout the period always inferior to the 
percentage in IUT or in STS (the percentage in IUT always being superior to the 
percentage in STS). From 1981-82 to 1985-86 the percentage of students with grants 
in universities (IUT included) rose by 1.9 points, and the percentage of students with 
grants in IUT and STS diminished, by 2.5 and 0.8 points respectively. So the increase 
in the universities would be greater if students from IUTs are excluded. From 1985-86 
to 1987-88 the previous trend for IUT and STS changed, as the percentage of 
students with grant in these tracks increased, though more for STS than for IUT. In 
1987-88 the percentage in both tracks is similar (31.7% for the selective and 30% for 
the non-selective), whereas in 1985-86 the former was higher than the latter (30,9% 
and 24.2%). The percentage in university continued its upward tendency.  
Table 19 shows the funds devoted to social assistance to students in higher 
education. Social assistance con be divided into two components: first, direct 
assistance, that is, grants and assistance for studying, and second, indirect 
assistance, mainly comprising university preventive medicine, university buildings, 
accommodation (Cité Internationale Universitaire de Paris), and social security for 
students. Social assistance was mainly created under the Front Populaire [61] . From 
1975 to 1981, the percentage of direct assistance (the progressive component of 
social assistance, in contrast to indirect assistance) decreased from 49% of total 
assistance in 1975 to 42% in 1981. From 1981 to 1989 the picture changed 
completely, as the percentage of direct assistance increased (from 42% in 1981 to 
71% in 1989).  
            Therefore, again we cannot conclude that the hypothesis of partisan 
preferences is confirmed. The percentage of students receiving grants diminished 
from 1980 to 1990, after seven years of socialist government (it is also true that it 
diminished less than in the period of conservative governments between 1970 and 
1980). During the first socialist period the system of grants became gradually more 
regressive (and the following conservative government continued this tendency). 
Grants during this first socialist period were not given to prestigious tracks. And 
finally, although during the socialist period (specially the first period) direct 
assistance increased more than indirect assistance (the system of social assistance 
is more progressive), the same tendency was followed by the Chirac government.
The data presented now refers to the homogeneity of educational resources 
across regions. Table 20 shows the proportion of students in secondary education 
by track in different regions in France in 1992/93. As regards this indicator, 44% of 
students were in general education in France. But if this figure is disaggregated by 
regions we find differences. The lowest was in non-continental France, where this 
figure was only 36% in general education. But within continental France there were 
also differences. The most evident were, in general terms, between the North (where 
the percentage of general education was lower, around 42%; in Nord-Pas-De-Calais it 
was 40%) and the South (where this percentage was higher, around 46.5%; in the 
Mediterranee it was 48%). The exception in the North was the Île de France with a 
percentage of students in general education of 50% (but the Bassin Parisien had 
42%). In the volume Géographie de l’École we can also find the following data (or 
tendencies) of interest for this paper. Though the percentage of students from 15 to 
24 years old increased in every French region between 1968 and 1990, the 
differences, mainly between the North [62] and South of  France, were persistent 
(even if there were larger populations under 25 years old in the North than in the 
South), as for example is obvious if we compare enrolment rates at 18 years old 
through regions [Géographie de l’École ?:20-21]. As regards the expenditure on 
education per inhabitant under 25 years old  in 1990 by the MENC (Ministère de 
l’Éducation Nationale et de la Culture) there were also great differences between the 
North, where it was lower, and the South, where it was higher [Géographie de 
l’École ?:24-25]. The average number of students per class depended on the level 
and track of education. From 1980 to 1991 this average increased for the collège and 
the lycée général et technologique (but was more equal across regions) and 
decreased for the lycée professionnel (but regions were less equal than before). The 
percentage of classes with many students (depending on the level) was higher for 
the North than for the South for primary and lower secondary education [Géographie 
de l’École?:32-35]. The percentage of students receiving grants varied across 
regions, the North beneffiting greatly from grants in comparison with the South 
[Géographie de l’École ?:36-37]. Compensatory education, reflected in the ZEPs, was 
also targeted towards the most needy regions; more in the North than in the South, 
but in general they also varied in accordance with the level and track of education: 
12% for primary education, 15% for lower secondary education, 9% for vocational 
upper secondary education, and 2% for general and technical upper secondary 
education [Géographie de l’École ?:38-39]. Access to the bac increased in every 
region between1975 and 1991, and a very strong effort was made for the regions in 
the North, where disadvantages relating to this indicators persisted but were less 
acute than 15 years earlier [Géographie de l’École ?:46-47]. The percentage of 
students in special schools decreased from 1980-81 to 1991-92, but was still different 
by regions (there was a tiny increase in differences between the North, more 
students in these schools,  and the South, less students in these schools) 
[Géographie de l’École ?:58-59]. The proportion of foreign students in primary 
education increased from 9.2% to 9.4% between 1980 and 1991; the same figure for 
secondary education was 5.7% in 1980 and 7.3% in 1991. The inequalities, mainly 
between the East (the lowest proportion) and the West (the highest proportion) 
diminished between these two dates [Géographie de l’École ?:60-61]. The proportion 
of students in private education in 1991-92 was higher in the South-West than in the 
North-East, for primary education and secondary education. The private effort in 20 
years has been notable for the North-East [Géographie de l’École ?:62-63]. The 
entrants in higher education were more numerous in 1990 than in 1982 in France, 
and differences between the South-West (higher) and North-East (lower) have been 
diminished [Géographie de l’École ?:66-67].  
So, although after the two socialist periods there are still regional inequalities, 
mainly between the North and South of France, in some educational 
indicators, inequalities have diminished in general terms from 1980 to 1990 (though 
not every indicator; and not only “outcomes”, “outputs” such as differences in 
expenditure on education of the MENC and indicators of the quality of education 
such as the average number of pupils per class are persistent).  
Finally some indicators for the public-private sectors of education are 
presented. Table 21 reveals that, except for higher education, the higher the level of 
education, the more important the role of private education. In 1985 the percentage 
of private education was 13% for pre-primary education, 15% for primary education, 
and 24% for secondary education (for higher education was 11%). For all levels of 
education the percentage of private education was 18%. These figures did not 
change between 1985 and 1992, except for higher education, for which it slightly 
increased, and pre-primary education, that also decreased smoothly. Finally, Table 
22 shows the enrolments in different tracks in the second cycle of secondary 
education by type of institution. The table shows that the percentage of private 
education is higher for vocational education than for general and technical 
education. This is more obvious between 1960 and 1980, after 1980 the percentage of 
private education in both tracks was similar. Public subsidies to private education 
did not vary greatly from 1980 to 1988 (its percentage of total public expenditure on 
education is 12.4% in 1980 and 12.5% in 1988), though it did rise slightly between 
1975 and 1980 (from 11.7% to 12.4%) [63] .  
So, it seems that public subsidies to private education increased more under 
conservative governments than under socialist ones. Nevertheless, as regards 
enrolments in private education the party in power did not have any impact, as this 
indicator is constant throughout the whole period.  
   
5. CONCLUSIONS  
            Throughout this paper we have tried to evaluate to what extent egalitarian 
education policy in France was determined by the colour of the party in government. 
The conclusion is rather clear: the colour of the party had an almost insignificant 
impact on egalitarian education policy in France. 
The evidence presented in the comparison of countries of the European Union 
shows that though there are some general features of egalitarian education policies 
shared by all countries or at least by the majority of them, there are also a number of 
characteristics that vary greatly across countries. This points out to fact that there is 
no homogeneity of egalitarian education policies, at least among member countries 
of the EU. France presents an egalitarian education policy similar to other countries, 
or to the majority, in some respects, but with some peculiarities that the rest of 
countries do not share, or are only shared by a minority of them.  
From the historical development of laws, programs and measures by socialist 
and conservative governments, it is clear that the hypothesis of the impact of parties 
in egalitarian education policy is not confirmed, with some, but few, exceptions. 
Neither socialists nor conservatives have different and distinctive egalitarian 
education policies, there is continuity from the early eights to late nineties. The 
changes the two kinds of governments made are rather marginal, not sufficient to 
profoundly reshape egalitarian education policy. The models presented for socialists 
and conservatives in the theoretical framework do not apply to the French parties. 
Three important remarks should be made here: first, the implementation of the policy 
is as important as its design (the evidence tells for this case that when a government 
tries to do some actions coherent with its partisan preferences, they are not 
implemented, and vice versa, there is success in the implementation of actions 
against partisan preferences); the history of egalitarian education policy in 
France is full of implementation failures. Second, the changes of preferences within 
the same party are also very important (this aplies to the socialist party). Third, 
sometimes partisan preferences are not clear.  
The same kind of conclusions are reached for the time series of egalitarian 
education policy outputs. The starting hypothesis is not confirmed. Data either goes 
against the model or, when is coherent with the model, there is continuity between 
socialist and conservative governments, though with exceptions (sometimes, due to 
the characteristics of data, it is not possible to distinguish between governments).  
Taking this evidence into account, there are three possibilities to continue 
with the research (here we are mainly referring to the study of the French socialist 
party): First, the model is wrong, it has to be changed or at least revised. Second, as 
we only have a case, the model has to be contrasted with other cases, and it may be 
a valid one. The French socialist party could be an exception to the social 
democratic model. And third, mediating variables may have been very important for 
the overall explanation.  
The behaviour of the conservative party has been less paradoxical, as 
electoral support was in the two periods rather weak, and continuity was more 
coherent with its partisan model as the socialist governments were not adopting 
great measures against the ideological preferences of conservatives.  
Therefore, the evidence highlights the fact that partisan variables had very 
little impact on egalitarian education policy. May be other kind of theories, such as 
Hall’s [1986] thesis that stressed the role of institutional variables in the explanation 
of (economic) policy could be more powerful for this case.  
           Electoral support is important but not determinant. When the socialist party 
had a parliamentary majority it failed to develop the reforms they had in mind, 
possibly due to social pressures (of groups, such as the catholic groups, for 
example) or divisions within the party around aspects of the policy, and this may 
also have been due to other kind of institutional variables (hardly studied in this 
paper). After this failure there is a change of strategy mainly consisting of 
withdrawing what has been done or planned. In the second period, in late eighties, 
the socialists did not have the electoral support to relaunch the reforms.  
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[1] “Governments, Equality and Education Policy: The Spanish and French Social Democratic 
Governments”, Juan March Institute (CEACS), Madrid, November 1996.  
[2] This hypothesis could be extended to outcomes of egalitarian education policy. Unfortunatelly, 
outcomes are not going to be developed in this paper.  
[3] The term “implementation” is used in this paper as the success in adopting government plans to 
design policy, and/or the success in the transformation of the design into outputs.  
[4] See below for a concrete definition of partisan preferences.  
[5] See: [Bourdieu 1997; Bourdieu and Saint Martin 1987]. For explanations of this author see: 
[Accardo and Corcuff 1986; Harker 1990].  
[6] See: [Boudon 1974; 1979; 1990]. For explanations of this author see: [Murphy 1990;1992; Cohen 
1990].  
[7] The only reference Castles can find for a quantitative cross-national study of education policy is 
Verner [1979].  
[8] See Esping-Andersen [1990] for a similar critique of the use of social expending (welfare effort) as 
an indicator of the welfare states commitment to equality. His attempt to re-think welfare states in a 
more sociological way is of great interest to this paper. 
[9] The contribution of these fields of sociology and economics to this research are not going to be 
extensively treated in this paper. This discussion is contained in my thesis proposal mentioned 
before.  
[10] Kerckhoff [1995:327] also alludes to these two dimensions as the most significant institutional 
arrangements in the education system.  
[11] Due to lack of data and/or space some indicators are more developed in the paper than others, 
both in their historical account and in the tables. For both dimensions it is obvious that the specific 
factors can be different depending on th educational level at which they apply. In next section, when 
commenting on the social democratic ideas about education this point will be further developed.  
[12] See above for the discussion of Bourdieu.  
[13] The main prescription for those accepting cultural capital-social capital to be the main cause of 
inequality of educational opportunities is equalizing social classes, not in terms of equality of 
educational opportunities, but in terms of social and economic equality.  
[14] See for example: [Korpi 1995; Ambler 1991b]. Unfortunatelly this dimension is not going to be 
developed in the paper.  
[15] For a more extense account of the Rivière and Rueda’s model as well as of the critiques and 
developments done see my thesis proposal.  
[16] T.H. Marshall [1950] placed in tracking much emphasis, specially in the opportunities for second 
thoughts. Ralph H. Turner [1960] also did. In contemporary sociology of social stratification the 
phenomenon of tracking is very much explored, though almost exclusively from the point of view of 
its impact on social stratification.  
[17] Since social selection usually occurs below the university level, the proportion of “wealthy” 
students far outweighs that of the “poor” ones at this level. Universal access to university subsidized 
through public expenditure could be, and in fact usually is, regressive [see Le Grand 1982].  
[18] See for example Wilson [1996] for different mechanisms used to support university students.  
[19] This idea is taken from the classical distinction Titmuss [1974] drew between “marginal social 
policy” and “institutional social policy”. The later implies that in order to “push” middle classes to 
state schools, these “should be so good that member of all classes will want their chidren to 
attend” [Erikson and Aberg 1987:6].  
[20] Maravall cites three studies presenting evidence that social democratic government limited their 
reforms to the introduction of meritocratic changes, leaving the stratification system and the selective 
character of education system unaltered: Parking [1972], Scase [1977], Hewitt [1977]. But he states 
that the evidence that social democratic governments increased public expenditure on education and 
enrolment rates far outweighs the counter-evidence presented in the three studies. The problem is 
that both statements do not refer to the same point.  
[21] The term “partisan preferences” is taken from Boix [1994]; it refers to different ideological 
conceptions in economic policy of the relationship between equality and efficiency and the possible 
trade-offs of stressing more one or the other (it is against the idea that goverments of different 
families of parties stress either equality or efficiency). The idea that equality of opportunities is 
embedded in a larger vision of the good society, for instance ideologies, and is broader than just the 
traditional concept of meritocracy is from Galston [1986].  
[22] Marshall himself considered education to be a component of social citizenship, an individual 
(social) right [1950: 107].  
[23] The selection of these countries for comparison is justified in terms of geographical proximity 
and the quality of available data. The comparison has usually been made for the latest available date.  
[24] Belgium has compulsory education from 6 to 18, but from 15 years old it is part-time education.  
[25] In Spain after the reform the duration of compulsory education is from 6 to 16 years old, a total of 
10 years.  
[26] Primary education in France is from 6 to 10 years old and is studied in primary schools. Lower 
secondary education is from 11 to 16 years old and is studied in collèges (these are theoretical 
durations).  
[27] In the traditional type in the French and German-speaking communities in Belgium, this age is 12 
years old; in Greece educational guidance courses are between 12 and 14 years old; in the Flemish 
Community in Belgium, vocational education begins at 13 years old.
[28] Lycée is where upper secondary education is studied.  
[29] Upper secondary education is studied in France in lycées. It is clearly divided in two tracks: one 
selective, comprising general and technical education, and one vocational. Its theoretical duration is 
three years for general and technological education (from 16 to 18) and two or four years for 
vocational education (from 16 to 17 or 19 years). The last year of upper secondary education is called 
baccalauréat. the tracks are the same as for upper secondary education. At the end there is an exam 
and a certificate, different for every track. The organizational structure of higher education differs 
greatly among countries. France has a peculiar system of higher education. There are four main 
tracks in higher education: university (excluding IUT) of a non-selective character, IUT (university 
short vocationally oriented courses of a selective character), STS (short vocationally oriented courses 
of a non-selective character in lycées), CPGE (preparation classes for Grandes Écoles in lycées), and 
Grandes Écoles (a highly selective and prestigious non-universitary sector). IUT, STS and CPGE last 
two years. Duration for university and grandes écoles is variable.  
[30] The porcentual base is the total of pupils in upper secondary education, which means that there 
is a number of people (more or less depending on the case) already outside the education system, 
taking into account that this level is usually not compulsory.  
[31] It is striking the comparison of these figures with those of Table 3 that show the tracking for lower 
secondary education. The Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden, present a degree of tracking 
higher for uppuer secondary education than for lower secondary education.  
[32] The exception here is United Kingdom, where 76% of students have grant and 28% a loan.  
[33] Basic references for the analysis of this period are: [Prost 1990; Ambler 1985a; 1995/96?; Ambler 
and Neathery 1996; Leclercq 1993; OCDE 1996]. The most detailed and accurate information is 
contained in Prost [1990].  
[34] This clearly contradicts the model of partisan preferences of egalitarian education policy, 
because the education system was transformed from a dual to a comprehensive one when throughout 
this period the successive Presidents of the Republic were conservative, though it is not that clear 
that the governments may be considered as such.  
[35] It is also true that during the Front Populaire there were a few minor measures and projects to 
integrate higher primary education schools into lycées [Prost 1990:38-39 and 46; Leclercq 1993:?], 
that is, the non-selective track into the selective one. Some authors [Ambler 1985a:117-122; 
1995/96?:217-220] state that the “idea” of the unitary school came from the left in France, but that the 
right carried out the specific reforms. For the explanation of previous reforms, see below.  
[36] For descriptions of the previous system see: [Ambler 1995/96?:203; Leclercq 1993:?; Prost 
1990:38-42].  
[37] Elementary education is similar to what is now called primary education. Therefore, primary 
education in the present system is different than primary education in the old one.  
[38] At this level there were also collèges, municipal institutions similar to, but less prestigious than, 
lycées. With the passage of time these collèges were progressively associated with EPS.  
[39] See the recently published and unfinished brilliant book by Albert Camus, The First Man. It tells 
the story of a working class child (himself), and one of the central parts of the book is his experience 
through the education system in France (Algeria). One of the most striking things the book tells is the 
extraordinary role the teacher had in orientating (working class) children from primary schools to 
lycées.  
[40] In 1941, under the Vichy government, the Minister Carcopino enacted an important measure to 
transform EPS into “modern collèges” and integrating them into secondary education [Prost 1990:42].
[41] In the French education system the lower secondary education comprised four grades, from 6th 
to 3rd, the 6th being the lowest and the 3rd being the highest grade (the corresponding normal ages 
were from 11 to 14).  
[42] For this part the main references are: [Savary 1985:35-42; Ambler 1994b:194-198; 1994a:457; 
1995/96?:213-214; Monchambert 1993; EURYDICE 1992:41-44; OCDE 1996:?].  
[43] This was so in spite of the Marie Law of 1951 that made it possible for students in private schools 
to get general education grants (bourses d‘enseignement général), and the Barangé Law also of 1951, 
that introduced education subsidies for schools -allocations scolaires- (but depending on the number 
of students in each year).  
[44] The Debré law contradicts the partisan model presented in the introduction. Two questions are 
relevant at this point: why the Debré Law sought to regulate and even integrate private schools into 
the public education sector?, and why not simply fund them outside the state control? Nevertheless, 
after the Debré law, the following measures were more on the line proposed in the model.  
[45] The main references for this part are: [Magliulo 1982:113-124; OCDE 1996:?; García Garrido 
1993:239-241; Ambler 1985a:120-141; 1995/96?:3-4].  
[46] See also Conseil de L’Europe [1988:27-30].  
[47] Although this is merely an expansionist target, not necessarily related to equality.  
[48] The question here is why, when the socialists won power, they were only able to implement the 
reform on compensatory education (ZEPs) and other minor ones, and experienced some failures such 
as the attempt to integrate CPGE and GE into the university system? Their objectives were coherent 
with the partisan model proposed in this paper, but not the measures (or non-measures) adopted, that 
is, its implementation.  
[49] Another question is why, when Chèvenement was appointed to the Ministry of education in 1984, 
he abandoned every line of reform Savary had tried. He even neglected compensatory education that 
Savary had implemented successfully. He merely launched an expansionist goal [Ambler 
1995/96?:218].  
[50] See mainly: [Savary 1985; Ambler 1985a:129-132; Ambler 1995/96?:215; García Garrido 1993:239-
241].  
[51] See also Conseil de l’Europe [1988: 24-27].  
[52] Education policy was very important for French politics, as for instance is the fact that not only 
Savary was removed from his place, Pierre Mauroy was also; he was replaced by Fabius.  
[53] There are two interrelated questions relevant here: what led the socialist party to choose the 
strategy of compromise in the public-private issue of education?, and why did the socialist party, 
through Savary following the directives of the President of the Republic and the Primer Minister, not 
withdraw the subsidies to private education following the old secular principle that the PS accepted?
The final result after the default of the Savary bill and the replacement of Savary by Chèvenement, is 
against the model of partisan preferences of egalitarian education policy, as private schools receive 
public funds but they are not strongly controlled by the state, in order to homogenize standards.  
[54] Quoted in Ambler [1995/96?:218]. Discourse at the National Assembly in July 1989.  
[55] As regards our model of governments and egalitarian education policy this rise in university fees 
is striking, taking into account the conservative nature of the coalition in govenment. Nevertheless, 
there is no reference to a parallel increase in grants for this level of education.  
[56] There is an outstanding questions here that is against our partisan preferences model: why the 
Socialist Ministry of Education continued to stick to expansionist targets and did not propose other 
kind of egalitarian measures within this dimension?  
[57] The question here is: why there was also inaction in the financial measures in this period?  
[58] There are two implementation failures in this period: one, the government proposal to limit the 
number of students in IUTs (a selective track of higher education), and two, the government proposal 
to increment subsidies to private schools. And the question is why.  
[59] This change of preferences has been studied mainly for economic policy: there is a first attempt 
to implement electoral promises, followed by a change of direction, intensified by the following 
conservative government of Chirac in 1986.  
[60] There are ten different types of grants. Students  in the tenth type get more money than students 
in the 1st type, which implies that students in the 1st type are wealthier than those in the 10th type.  
[61] Social Security for students was created later, in 1948.  
[62] Always with the exception of Île de France.  
[63] Data from EURYDYCE [1992:46].  
Tables 
  
Table 1. Average duration of pre-school education and its theoretical duration for member states 
(1992/93) 
  Average duration1 (years) Theoretical duration (years) 
Belgium 3.37 3,5 
Denmark 3.26 3,5 
Germany 2.73 3 
Greece 1.07 2 
Spain 2.52 3 
France 3.36 4 
Ireland 2.16 2 
Italy 2.89 3 
Luxembourg 1.88 2 
Netherlands 0.99 1 
Austria 2.08 3 
Portugal 1.66 3 
Finland 1.6 6 
Sweden 2.5 4 
England and Wales 1.14 2 
Northern Ireland 0.39 2 
Scotland 0.79 2 
Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:29 and 145]. 
1. The average duration of pre-school education is obtained by adding the rates of pre-school attendance 
for the various ages. 
Table 2. A comparative analytical summary of education pathways (assessment and guidance: 
compulsory education) in member states (1994) 
  Compulsory education End of compulsory education 
Initial educational 
guidance 
Belgium 
- from age 6 to 18, part time from 
age 15 
- 12 years 
- certificates awarded by the school 
and later approved by a Commission 
- at age 12, at the beginning of 
secondary education, in the 
traditional type, at age 14 in the 
reformed type in the French and 
German-speaking Communities 
- at age 13, for vocational education, 
in the Flemish Community 
Denmark - from age 7 to 16 
- 9 years 
- no final general examination 
- possibility of taking examinations in 
certain subjects chosen by the pupil 
- at age 16, after the Folkeskole4
 
- optional guidance courses from the 
age of 14 
Germany - from age 6 to 18 
- 12 years - internal examination 
- at age 10, at the end of the 
Grundschule5 - but in some Länder, 
guidance is given in the 5th and 6th 
years 
Greece - from age 5 ½ to 15 
- 9 ½ years 
- leaving certificate, depending on 
results 
- otherwise an examination is 
organised for pupils who are not 
awarded this certificate 
- at age 15 and educational 
guidance courses between age 12 
and 14 
Spain 
pre-reform1: - from age 6 to 14
 
- 8 years 
post-reform: - from age 6 to 16 
- 10 years 
pre-reform: - leaving certificate 
without examination, provided the 3 
cycles of the general basic 
education have been successfully 
completed 
post-reform: - a school leaving 
certificate, whatever the level 
attained by the pupil 
pre-reform: - after the EGB, at age 
14 
post-reform:- at age 16, at the 
beginning of the Bacchillerato6 
course 
France - from age 6 to 16 
- 10 years 
- in order to complete compulsory 
education, pupils must have one 
year of full-time education, either 
in the traditional lycée3 or in a 
vocational lycée 
- at age 14, in 3rd year of the 
collège7 
Ireland - from age 6 to 15 
- 9 years 
- national examination with two 
levels of difficulty (Ordinary and 
Higher) for Junior Certificate (since 
1992) 
- at age 12 
Italy - from age 6 to 14 
- 8 years 
- final examination to obtain the 
Licenza Media2, administered by the 
school 
- guidance counselling 
- at age 14 
Luxembourg - from age 4 to 15 
- 11 years 
- certificate at the end of compulsory 
education, without examination, on 
the basis of results 
- at age 12 
Netherlands - from age 5 to 16 
- 11 years - internal and national examination 
- at age 13 (transition year from age 
12 to 13) 
Portugal - from age 6 to 15 
- 9 years 
- no examination 
- certificate 
- at age 15, after the 3rd cycle of 
basic education 
- educational guidance courses from 
age 14 
United 
Kingdom 
(England, 
Wales, 
Northern 
Ireland, 
Scotland) 
England, Wales and Scotland: - from 
age 5 to 16 
- 11 years 
Northern Ireland: from age 4 to 16 
- 12 years 
- national examination 
- at age 16 in principle 
- educational guidance courses 
between age 14 and 16 
Sources: [EURYDICE 1994:23-25]. 
1. The reform, contained mainly in the LOGSE (Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema 
Educativo) passed in 1990. 
2. Licenza Media means the diploma given at the end of lower secondary education. 
3. Lycée means upper secondary education. 
4. Folkeskole means compulsory education. 
5. Grundschule means primary education. 
6. Bachillerato means upper secondary education. 
7. Collège means lower secondary education. 
Table 3. Organisation of systems of lower secondary education in some countries in Europe (1994)
Single continuous system Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway 
Common core curriculum / common general 
education 
Spain, Portugal, France, Italy, Greece, United 
Kingdom, Iceland 
Differentiated branches or types of education Ireland, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Switzerland 
Source: [EURYDICE 1994:29]. 
Table 4. Assessment in the member states3 by level of education (1994)
  
  
  
Continuous local 
assessment without 
external tests
Local assessment with 
external tests 
standardised or not 
Primary 
education 
Final certificate with 
examination Belgium, Italy   
Final certificate without 
examination Greece   
No final certificate or 
final examination
Germany, Denmark, Spain, 
France, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Netherlands, 
Ireland, United Kingdom 
  
National examination 
for purposes of 
selection and guidance
  
Luxembourg, Northern 
Ireland, Netherlands 
(optional at the end of last 
year)
Lower 
secondary 
education 
Final certificate with 
examination Belgium, Italy, Greece 
France, Ireland, 
Netherlands (LBO, 
MAVO1), United Kingdom 
Final certificate without 
examination 
Denmark (optional 
examination), Germany, 
Spain, Luxembourg, Portugal 
  
No final certificate or 
final examination Netherlands (HAVO, VWO
2)   
Upper 
secondary 
general 
education3 
Final certificate Belgium, Greece 
Denmark, Germany, 
France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Austria, Finland 
Final certificate without Spain, Portugal, Sweden   
examination 
Sources: [EURYDICE 1994:37-38.] 
1. LBO means vocational lower secondary education and MAVO means general lower secondary 
education towards vocational (upper) secondary education. 
2. HAVO means general upper secondary education towards vocational higher education and VWO 
means upper general secondary education focused towards university. 
3. Sweden, Austria and Finland are included at this level because it is the only level contained in 
[EURYDICE 1996:56]. 
Table 5. Enrollment rates (%) by age (years) in member states (1992)
  2 3 4 5 6 7 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Austria 1 29 66.3 86.2 98.4 100 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Belgium 38 97.7 99.3 97.7 99.8 99.1 98.9 98.7 97.2 90.6 75.2 59.6 43.9 31.1 20 11.5 6.6
Denmark 14.3 37.9 53.6 61.1 96.4 99.7 93.4 97.8 92.4 73.8 68.5 53.1 41.2 34.7 31.2 26.3 24.2
Finland 14.8 24.3 28.1 32 57.6 99.5 99.8 99.8 94.5 85.2 81.7 39.9 36.3 40.3 40.1 33.2 27
France 34.7 98.8 101.4 101.5 100.6 100.2 94.3 94.1 92.1 84.9 77.9 64.6 46.6 33.5 32.8 15.8 10.1
Germany1 0 78.5 68.5 78.5 115.1 97.5 93.9 93.1 95.3 81.7 82.8 61.1 41.2 31.1 36.8 18.7 18.4
Greece 0 11.2 48.9 85.2 102.5 95.6 94.2 86.1 88.4 61.4 44.7 44.6 25.6 18.1 8.1 6 3.7
Ireland 0 1.2 55.7 100 99.1 100.5 97.6 94.3 87.5 76.5 57.5 39.1 29.6 19.4 11.1 6.1 4
Italy 0 91.8 97.5 99.9 100 100 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Luxembourg 0 0.02 89 99 100 100 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Netherlands 0 0 98 98.8 97.7 100 98.7 99 97.3 74.7 73.4 61.5 48.5 38.7 28 21.6 16.2
Portugal 0 22.4 28.6 32.3 100 100 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Spain 8.3 37.2 95.8 100.4 103.2 103.8 100.4 91 75.6 67.3 53.8 44.8 42.7 34 27.9 19.3 14
Sweden 0 45.2 50.8 60.6 99.9 97.5 99.7 95.6 89.2 86.9 60.8 24.3 16.5 16.1 27.9 13.7 12.5
United 
Kingdom 0.01 37 90.1 98.9 98.5 98.8 99.6 98.9 75.3 56.7 33.6 23.9 19.5 13.7 8.1 5.2 3.7
Table 5 (continuation): Enrollment rates (%) by age (years) in member states (1992)
  22-252 26-29 
Austria n.d. n.d. 
Belgium 8.3 1.2 
Denmark 21.4 9.8 
Finland 23.4 11 
France 14.9 4 
Germany1 13.3 7.7 
Greece 4.7 0.9 
Ireland n.d. n.d. 
Italy n.d. n.d. 
Luxembourg n.d. n.d. 
Netherlands 13.6 3.9 
Portugal n.d. n.d. 
Spain 15.2 5 
Sweden 13.1 6.2 
United Kingdom 5.7 2.5 
Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:26-27; OCDE 1995a:131-155]. 
1. Germany means ex-Federal Republic of Germany. 
2. Higher education only. 
Table 6. Percentages of pupils in general and vocational upper secondary education in member 
states (1992/93)
  General Vocational 
Belgium 46.41 53.59 
Denmark 44.93 55.07 
Germany 20.67 79.33 
Greece 63.86 36.14 
Spain 58.77 41.23 
France 44.72 55.28 
Ireland 75.38 24.62 
Italy 28.03 71.97 
Luxembourg 37.23 62.77 
Netherlands 29.54 70.46 
Austria 21.76 78.24 
Portugal 81.16 18.84 
Finland 48.76 51.24 
Sweden 28.64 71.36 
United Kingdom 44.57 55.43 
Average EU 40.96 59.04 
Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:46 and 150]. 
Table 7. Public expenditure on education in member states (1992)
  Public expenditure on education per pupil as a % of per capita GDP 
Belgium 36.4 
Denmark 38.1 
Germany (ex-FRG) 32.2 
Greece n.d. 
Spain 29.4 
France 31.1 
Ireland 56.9 
Italy 33.7 
Luxembourg n.d. 
Netherlands 51.5 
Austria 32.3 
Portugal n.d. 
Finland 59.7 
Sweden 42.9 
United Kingdom 65.6 
Sources: [OECD 1995a: 92]. 
Table 8. Public expenditure on education by levels in member states (1992)
  Public expenditure on education per pupil as a % of per capita GDP 
 Pre-primary education 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Higher 
education 
Belgium 10.3 13.2 28.5 21.2 
Denmark 35.8 24 28 26.4 
Germany 
(ex-FRG) 16.5 14.7 30.5 25.7 
Greece n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Spain 16.3 15.9 21.8 19.5 
France 14 15.6 29.3 23.7 
Ireland 13.7 13.9 21.7 17.6 
Italy 18.9 23.3 27.1 25.7 
Luxembourg n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Netherlands 13.2 15.1 19.5 17.6 
Austria 18.2 22.2 35.6 30.5 
Portugal n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 
Finland 43.4 26.6 33.3 30.1 
Sweden 36.5 29.1 36.4 32.8 
United 
Kingdom 11.8 19.7 27.8 23.9 
Sources: [OECD 1995a: 88-91]. 
Table 9. Forms of revenue of higher education institutions in some member states (for 
different years)
Country (and year) Public funds (%) Fees (%) Other kind of revenues (%) 
Finland (1987) 85 (minimum) 15 
France (1984) 89.5 4.7 5.8 
Germany (1986) 68.5 0 31.5 
Netherlands (1985) 80 12 8 
Spain1 (middle 80') 80 20 n.d. 
United Kingdom 
(1986-87) 
- Universities: 55 
- Polytechnic Colleges 
(England only): 72.4 
13.7 
16.2 
31.3 
11.4 
Sources: [OCDE 1990:102]. 
1. Data only for universities. 
Table 10. Financial assistance to students in higher education in some member states (for 
different years)
Country (and 
date) 
Form of 
assistance2 Percentage of 
GDP 
Maximum 
assistance per 
student (in 
dollars) 
Average 
assistance per 
student (in 
dollars)1 
Percentage of 
beneficiaries 
Denmark (1986-
87) 
subsidies + 
loans 
n.d. - -22 years old 
students: 5,266 
- 22 or +22 
years old 
students: 5,869 
n.d. n.d. 
Finland (1987) loans/subsidies 0.19 4,157 1,782 the majority 
France (1986-87) 
subsidies and 
indirect 
assistance 
0.084 2,009 2003 18 
Germany (1986) loans 0.12 n.d. 608 n.d. 
Greece (1987) 
indirect 
assistance/ 
subsidies 
0.1 n.d. 209 n.d. 
Netherlands 
(1988) 
subsidies 
loans 
0.25 4,856   
412 
95 
45 
Portugal (1987) 
indirect 
assistance and 
subsidies 
n.d. n.d. 57 8 
Spain (1986) subsidies 0.056 n.d. 115 n.d. 
United Kingdom 
(1984-85) 
(1988-89) 
  
subsidies 
subsidies 
  
0.37 
  
  
3,648 
  
1,467 
  
  
82 
Sources: [OCDE 1990:98 and 104-105]. 
1. The average is calculated taking into account every student. 
2. Indirect assistance is included in this column when it represents an important part of the total 
assistance. It is excluded from the rest of the table. 
3. Data is from 1988. 
4. Data includes loans also (date is 1984). 
5. Data for both subsidies and loans (date from 1984). 
6. Data is from 1987. 
7. Data is from 1983. 
Table 11. Systems of grants at the higher level of education in member states (1993) 
   
  
Tuition 
fees 
Form of main 
financial 
support 
Depends 
on income 
of student/
parents/ 
spouse 
Depends on 
academic 
criteria 
Percentage of 
all students 
receiving direct 
assistance 
Amount variable 
according to 
income and/or 
place of 
residence 
Other social benefits
Belgium  yes 
- French 
Community: 
grant + loan 
- Flemish 
Community: 
grant 
yes yes - Fr. Com.: 20% 
- Fl. Com.: 23% yes 
- family allowances paid 
until age 25 
- tax allowances 
- reduced tuition fees 
- concessionary fares 
Denmark  no grant + loan no no 100% (78%)1 yes no
Germany 
(ex-FRG)  no 
grant 50% 
loan 50% yes yes 
33% (West) 
90% (East) yes 
- family allowances until 
age 27 
- tax allowances 
Greece  no grant + loan yes yes 7% yes 
- family allowances 
- free medical services 
- concessionary fares 
- free course material 
Spain  yes grant yes yes +/-20% yes 
grants: 
- travelling expenses 
- public transport 
- accommodation 
- exemption from tuition 
fees 
- course material 
France  yes grant + loan yes yes +/-18% yes 
- exemption from 
tuition fees (in the 
public sector) 
- tax allowances 
travelling expenses 
Ireland  yes grant + loan yes yes +/-34% yes - reduced tuition fees
Italy  yes grant + loan yes yes 2.5% yes 
- family allowances paid 
until age 26 
- exemption from tuition 
fees 
Luxembourg  no grant + loan yes no 80% yes - family allowances paid until age 27 
Netherlands  yes grant + loan no (for the basic grant) no 100% yes 
- family allowances 
- tax allowances 
- free pass for public 
transport 
Portugal  yes grant + loan yes no 10 to 15% yes 
- reductions on price of 
educational materials; 
free medical care, sports 
and cultural activities 
United 
Kingdom  yes grant + loan yes yes 
76% grant 
28% loan yes 
- remission of tuition fees
Sources: [EURYDICE 1993:4]; data for percentage of all students receiving direct assistance (grants) for 
Austria 13%, Finland is 59% and Sweden 67% [EURYDICE 1996:78]. 
1. In parenthesis data from [EURYDICE 1996:78]. 
Table 12. Existing student loan programmes in some member states (for different years)
Country (and 
date) 
Repayment 
mechanism 
Purpose of 
support 
% of students 
with loans 
Average loan 
(value $US) 
Year scheme 
began 
Denmark 
(1985) mortgage loan living n.d. 3,700 1975 
Finland 
(1987) mortgage loan living n.d. 2,200 1986 
France (n.d.) mortgage loan living 1 n.d. n.d. 
Germany 
(1987) mortgage loan living 30 1,500 1974 
Netherlands 
(1989) mortgage loan living n.d. 200 n.d. 
Sweden (n.d.) income contingent living n.d. 5,828 n.d. 
United 
Kingdom 
(1993) 
mortgage loan living 44 750 1990 
Sources: [Wilson 1996:117]. 
Table 13. Enrolments in public and private education by level of education in member states (1992)
  
  
% of enrolments1 by institution
Enrolments in private education as a % of total 
enrolments by level of education 
 Public Private grant-aided 
Private non-
grant aided 
Pre-primary 
education 
Primary 
education
Secondary 
education 
Belgium 20.7 33.2 n.d. 57 56 66
Denmark 51.4 3.5 n.d. 10 10 16
Germany (ex-
FRG) n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Greece 47 n.d. 3 5 7 4
Spain 40.4 12.1 4.4 36 35 31
France 47.1 n.d. n.d. 12 15 21
Ireland 55.8 0.7 n.d. 100 100 n.d.
Italy 46.7 n.d. 3.6 29 7 7
Luxembourg n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 1 n.d.
Netherlands 14.4 40.4 n.d. 68 69 76
Austria 47.2 3.3 n.d. 26 4 8
Portugal n.d. n.d. n.d. 58 8 8
Finland 58.5 2.2 n.d. 2 1 5
Sweden 49.5 0.7 0.1 8 2 2
United 
Kingdom 44.3 3.7 3.9 6 5 9
Sources:[OECD 1995a:12%] for the first indicator; [UNESCO 1995:157] for the second indicator. 
1. % of 5 to 29 age group. 
Table 14. Distribution of public expenditure by kind of institution and level of education in member 
states (1992)
  Pre-school education
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education Higher education 
All levels of 
education 
 Public 
Private 
grant- 
aided 
Private 
non 
grant-
aided 
Public 
Private 
grant- 
aided 
Private 
non 
grant- 
aided 
Public
Private 
grant-
aided 
Private 
non 
grant-
aided 
Public
Private 
grant- 
aided 
Private 
non 
grant- 
aided 
Public 
Private 
grant-
aided 
Private 
non 
grant-
aided 
Belgium n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 38.2 61.8 0 n.d. n.d. n.d.
Denmark 98.7 1.3 0 94.6 5.4 0 94.7 5.3 0 100 0 0 93.5 3.4 3
Germany 
(ex-FRG) 62.2 37.8 0 99.4 0.6 0 64 4.8 31.2 98.7 1.3 0 75.2 6.2 18.6
Greece n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Spain 64.2 5.2 30.6 71.3 24.5 4.2 80 11.5 8.5 92.2 0 7.8 79.6 11.3 9
France 89.1 10.7 0.2 88.1 11.7 0.2 82 17.3 0.7 90.5 6.7 2.7 85.9 13.2 0.9
Ireland 98.3 0 1.7 98.5 0 1.5 99.7 0 0.3 99 0 1 99.1 0 0.9
Italy n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Luxembourg n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Netherlands 32.9 67.1 0 32.4 67.6 0 20.6 79.4 0 56.1 43.8 0 34.6 65.4 0
Austria 94 6 0 99.6 0.4 0 99.3 0.7 0 91.9 8.1 0 96.9 3.1 0
Portugal n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d.
Finland 100 0 0 98.7 1.3 0 91.8 8.2 0 95.6 4.4 0 93.4 6.6 0
Sweden 100 0 0 99.3 0.7 0 98.9 1.1 0 98.9 0 1.1 99.2 0.6 0.2
United 
Kingdom 100 0 0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 22.2 77.8 0 n.d. n.d. n.d.
Sources: [OECD 1995a: 79-82 and 84]. 
Table 15. Students1 in upper secondary education and in the baccalauréat by track in France (1960-
1994) 
  Upper secondary education Baccalauréat 
  General and Technical Vocational 
General and 
technical Vocational 
1960 421,900 
(52%) 
383,200 
(48%) - - 
1970 848,600 
(57%) 
650,6 
(43%) 167,299 - 
1980 1,102,600 
(59%) 
773,200 
(41%) 222,400 - 
1985 1,207,600 
(60%) 
805,800 
(40%) 253,050 - 
1988 1,444,200 
(67%) 
711,100 
(33%) 
306,107 
(98%) 
7,555 
(2%) 
1990 1,571,000 
(69%) 
696,000 
(31%) 
359,847 
(94%) 
24,750 
(6%) 
1993 1,529,000 
(69%) 
682,000 
(31%) n.d. n.d. 
1994 1,500,000 
(69%) 
683,000 
(31%) 
389,0582
 
(85%) 
70,7712
 
(15%) 
Sources:  
- Upper secondary education: [Duran-Prinborgne 1991:28] for the years from 1960 to 1988; [L’état de 
l’école nº5 1995:45] for the years from 1990 to 1994. 
- Bac: [Duran-Prinborgne 1991:31] for the years from 1985 to 1990; [Ambler and Neathery 1995: Table 2] 
for the rest. 
1. In parenthesis % of students in every track from the total in every level of education. 
2. Data is for the year 1995. 
Table 16. French students5 in higher education by tracks (1960-1993)
  University (excluding IUT2) IUT STS
3 CPGE4 Écoles 
1960-611 214,700 
(69%) n.d. 
8,000 
(2%) 
21,000 
(7%) 
66,000 
(21%) 
1970-71 637,000 
(75%) 
24,200 
(3%) 
26,800 
(3%) 
32,600 
(4%) 
130,000 
15%) 
1980-81 804,418 
(68%) 
53,667 
(4%) 
67,908 
(6%) 
40,123 
(3%) 
214,150 
(18%) 
1985-86 905,973 
(66%) 
61,905 
(4%) 
118,832 
(9%) 
47,334 
(3%) 
233,514 
(17%) 
1986-87 907,794 
(66%) 
62,872 
(5%) 
131,187 
(9%) 
48,811 
(3%) 
226,407 
(16%) 
1988-89 969,527 
(65%) 
67,101 
(4%) 
163,791 
(11%) 
57,940 
(4%) 
230,292 
(15%) 
1990-91 1,097,600 
(65%) 
74,300 
(4%) 
199,100 
(12%) 
67,500 
(4%) 
260,300 
(15%) 
1993-94 1,302,300 
(63%) 
92,800 
(4%) 
232,800 
(11%) 
72,600 
(3%) 
374,100 
(18%) 
Sources: [Ambler and Neathery 1996:Table 3] for years 1960, 1970, 1990 and 1993; [Duran-Prinborgne 
1991:45] for year from 1980 to 1988. 
1. In [Ambler and Neathery 1995:Table 3] data refers to metropolitan France. 
2. IUT means Instituts Universitaires de Technologie (University Institute of Technology). 
3. STS means Sections de Techniciens Supérieur (Advanced Technical Section). 
4. CPGE means Cours Preparatoires aux Grandes Écoles (Preparation Clases for Grandes Écoles). 
5. In parenthesis the percentage of students in every track from the total of students in higher education. 
Table 17. French students receiving grants (social criteria) by type of grant in higher education 
(1975-1987) 
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th Total 
1975-76 - - - 11,487 
(11%) 
12,498 
(12%) 
9,612 
(9%) 
17,792 
(17%) 
8,845 
(8%) 
41,345 
(40%) 
2,081 
(2%) 
103,660 
(100%) 
1980-81 - 15,409 
(13%) - 
5,767 
(5%) 
9,946 
(8%) 
7,031 
(6%) 
14,368 
(12%) 
7,567 
(6%) 
56,739 
(49%) - 
116,827 
(100%) 
1981-82 - 13,726 
(12%) - 
5,963 
(5%) 
8,754 
(7%) 
8,396 
(7%) 
12,309 
(10%) 
10,447 
(9%) 
59,085 
(50%) - 
118,680 
(100%) 
1985-86 8,924 
(6%) 
7,250 
(4%) 
9,149 
(6%) 
8,057 
(5%) 
13,078 
(8%) 
11,381 
(7%) 
19,989 
(12%) 
10,718 
(7%) 
71,264 
(45%) - 
159,810 
(100%) 
1986-87 9,579 
(6%) 
7,490 
(4%) 
10,043 
(6%) 
8,699 
(5%) 
14,171 
(8%) 
11,801 
(7%) 
21,962 
(13%) 
11,423 
(7%)) 
76,365 
(44%) - 
171,533 
(100%) 
1987-88 10,256 
(5%) 
8,567 
(4%) 
11,168 
(6%) 
9,531 
(5%) 
15,789 
(8%) 
13,146 
(7%) 
24,359 
(13%) 
12,185 
(6%) 
83,176 
(44%) - 
188,177 
(100%) 
Sources: [OCDE 1989:41-42]. 
Table 18. Percentage of students with grant in higher education by track in France (1981-1987)
  1981-82 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 
Universities (with 
IUT) 13 14.9 15.8 16.6 
IUT 32.4 30.9 31.1 31.7 
STS 25 24.2 26.5 30 
Sources: [OCDE 1989:34]. 
Table 19. Funds for social assistance to students1 in higher education in France (1975-1989)
  Direct assistance2 Indirect assistance3 Total social assistance 
1975 421.7 
(49%) 
429.8 
(51%) 851.5 
1980 414.4 
(44%) 
535.5 
(56%) 949.9 
1981 391.8 
(42%) 
545 
(58%) 936.8 
1985 628.4 
(53%) 
552.9 
(47%) 1,181.3 
1986 653.6 
(61%) 
421.2 
(39%) 1,074.8 
1988 808.3 
(68%) 
378.9 
(32%) 1,187.2 
1989 973.8 
(71%) 
395.1 
(29%) 1,368.9 
Sources: [OCDE 1989:44-45]. 
1. In millions of constant Francs, with 1975 base; in parenthesis the percentage of direct and indirect 
assistance from the total of social assistance 
2. Grants and assistance for studying (translation of Bourses et secours d’études). 
3. University preventive medicine, university buildings, accomodation (Cité Internationale Universitaire de 
Paris) and social security for students. 
Table 20. Students in upper secondary education by track in different regions of France (1992/93)
  Proportions of pupils in general and technical/vocational upper secondary education
  General Technical/ vocational Total % of general 
Île de France 217,795 221,523 439,318 50 
Bassin Parisien 199,051 269,898 468,949 42 
Nord-Pas-De-Calais 79,935 120,384 200,319 40 
Est 93,146 130,844 223,990 42 
Ouest 161,819 211,287 373,106 43 
Sud-Ouest 110,725 136,281 247,006 45 
Centre-Est 135,474 158,964 294,438 46 
Mediterranee 123,683 136,277 259,960 48 
Departements 
D’Outre-Mer 27,675 48,188 75,863 36 
France 1,149,303 1,433,646 2,582,949 44 
Sources: [EURYDICE 1996:151]. 
Table 21. Enrolments1 in public and private institutions by level of education in France (1975-1992) 
  Pre-primary education 
Primary  
education 
Secondary 
education 
Higher  
education 
All levels  
of education 
  Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
1985 2,196,645 
(85%) 
328,969 
(15%) 
3,499,350 
(85%) 
627,010 
(15%) 
4,275,425 
(76%) 
1,388,577 
(24%) 
1,182,263 
(89%) 
150,822 
(11%) 
11,369,437 
(82%) 
2,573,073 
(18%) 
1986 2,233,978 
(87%) 
329,486 
(13%) 
3,430,125 
(85%) 
616,133 
(15%) 
4,305,800 
(76%) 
1,400,429 
(24%) 
1,199,495 
(88%) 
158,402 
(12%) 
11,383,388 
(82%) 
2,581,496 
(18%) 
1988 2,208,435 
(88%) 
310,167 
(12%) 
3,464,602 
(85%) 
616,877 
(15%) 
4,319,666 
(75%) 
1,406,782 
(25%) 
1,231,401 
(88%) 
170,729 
(12%) 
11,434,259 
(82%) 
2,579,526 
(18%) 
1990 2,226,834 
(88%) 
309,121 
(12%) 
3,482,810 
(85%) 
613,005 
(15%) 
4,327,970 
(75%) 
1,424,916 
(25%) 
1,389,507 
(88%) 
195,782 
(12%) 
11,629,843 
(82%) 
2,617,598 
(18%) 
1992 2,241,573 
(88%) 
317,162 
(12%) 
3,445,037 
(85%) 
601,816 
(15%) 
4,360,078 
(76%) 
1,396,328 
(24%) 
1,594,929 
(87%) 
245,378 
(13%) 
11,835,617 
(82%) 
2,634,540 
(18%) 
Sources: [OECD 1995b:138, 140, 144, 146, 150, 152, 156, 158, 162 and 164]. 
1. Enrolments in private institutions and public institutions as a % of the total number of enrolments at every 
level of education. 
Table 22. Enrolments in different tracks in the second cycle of secondary education by kind of 
institution (1960-1992)1
  
  
General and technical 
education Vocational education
 Public institutions 
Private 
institutions
Public 
institutions 
Private 
institutions 
1960-61 326,300 
(77.3) 
95,600 
(22.7) 
256,200 
(66.9) 
127,000 
(33.1) 
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